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Law And Anthropology: 
A Review
Fr a n c is  Sn y d e r  i
Anthropology And Law
1. Purposes and Scope
The relationship between anthropology and law is often viewed as 
problematic or tenuous, but it may argued strongly that such a view is at best 
misleading. In order to sustain this assertion, this paper reviews some of the 
main themes in anthropological studies of law, dispute processing and social 
order. In addition it offers a preliminary evaluation of the contributions and 
limitations of anthropological approaches in relation to legal studies and to the 
development of social theories of law. It does not aim to present a full survey 
of the literature. Instead, it concentrates primarily on selected writings in 
English and to some extent French by scholars in the United States, Britain 
and continental Europe; the footnotes give references to selected literature 
from other countries. 2
2. Anthropology and Academic Law
The influence of anthropological approaches on academic legal studies 
has so far been marked only in the United States, especially through its elite
1 Professor of European Community Law, European University Institute; Professor of 
Law, College of Europe, Bruges; Honorary Visiting Professor, University College 
London. This paper is to appear in Philip Thomas (ed.), Law and the Social Sciences 
(Applied Legal Philosophy Series) (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1993). 
It is a revised and updated version of my article entitled 'Anthropology, Dispute 




























































































universities2, though the importance of the field has recently been recognised 
institutionally in France.2 In contrast to trends in sociology and law, the es­
tablishment of the anthropology of law as a distinct field of study has rarely 
resulted in the creation of centres for interdisciplinary research.4 
Anthropologists interested in law, and legal scholars with similar interests, are 
bound instead by informal networks, loose professional organisations and a 
handful of specialist journals.5
Moreover, collaboration between anthropologists and academic lawyers 
has always been unusual.6 This has been ascribed to the technical nature of
2 A comparison of the (American) Law and Society Review with the [British] Journal of 
Law and Society is instructive in this respect. In addition, anthropologists or scholars 
with strong interests in anthropological approaches have taught in major American law 
schools. Not all of these relations stem from anthropologists, of course; and the influ­
ence of such links outside the national law schools in the U.S. should not be overstated.
2 The first professorship in Legal Anthropology in France was established in 1988 at the 
Université d'Aix-Marseille III (Aix-en-Provence) and the second in 1989 at the 
Université de Paris I. On the situation in the Netherlands, see J. Van Houtte (eds), 
Sociology o f Law and Legal Anthropology in Dutch-Speaking Countries (1985) and K. 
von Benda-Beckmann and F. Strijosch (eds), Anthropology o f Law in the Netherlands 
(1986).
4 Among the exceptions is the Laboratoire d'Anthropologie Juridique, Université de Paris 
I, France. For an early discussion of its activities, see Le Roy, "Reflexions sur une in­
terprétation anthropologique du droit africain: Le Laboratoire d'Anthropologie 
Juridique" (1972) 26 Revue Juridique et Politique, Indépendance et Coopération 427- 
448. The two major, long-term projects in legal anthropology, one by Max Gluckman 
and his colleagues and students at the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute and later at 
Manchester, the other by Laura Nader and her students in the Berkeley Village Law 
Project, have been based at centres for social science research (excluding lawyers) or at 
departments of anthropology (and sociology, in the case of Manchester during most of 
Gluckman's time there).
5 The major umbrella organisation today is the International Union of Anthropological 
and Ethnological Sciences Commission on Folk Law and Legal Pluralism, established in 
December 1978 as the Commission on Contemporary Folk Law, which included 275 
members from numerous countries as of June 1992; see (1992) 25 Commission on Folk 
Law and Legal Pluralism Newsletter. In addition to individual members, the 
Commission includes various regional working groups. The Newsletters of the 
Commission describe other activities involving legal anthropologists and academic 
lawyers with similar interests. In the United States, the Association for Political and 
Legal Anthropology (APLA) was established in November 1976, now includes over 200 
members and publishes a newsletter. The Laboratoire d'Anthropologie Juridique in Paris 
also publishes periodically a Bulletin de Liaison. The first issue of Droits et Cultures 
(Cahiers du Centre de Recherche de l'U.E.R. de Sciences Juridiques, Université de 
Paris X, Nanterre), appeared in 1981. Anthropological articles on law and dispute pro­
cesses are published in the major anthropological and sociolical journals and also form 
the core of the Journal o f Legal Pluralism, the successor to African Law Studies.
6 The major exceptions are Llewellyn and Hoebel’s collaboration in The Cheyenne Way: 
Conflict and Case Law in Primitive Jurisprudence (1941) and J. Comaroff and S. 




























































































law as a discipline7, but more convincing reasons lie partly in differences in 
the training and objectives of anthropologists and lawyers.8 In the past, most 
anthropological studies of law concentrated on small-scale communities in 
Africa, Asia or Latin America, which academic lawyers in North America 
and Europe usually considered to be of little relevance to their own domestic 
legal systems.9 Today many anthropologists, like some sociologists of law, 
reject Western jurisprudence as a source of analytic concepts or, more impor­
tantly, of guidelines for research.10 Furthermore, the standard work of many 
anthropologists has been ethnographic description, with theories often being 
implicit or formulated at a very low level of abstraction. This has inhibited 
their making a more significant contribution to social theories of law.11 In 
any case, anthropologists often accord a low priority to this theoretical pro­
l u s i ) .  On Llewellyn and Hoebel, see W. Twining, Karl Llewllyn and the Realist 
Movement (1973), chapter 8, and Twining, "Law and Anthropology: A Case Study of 
Inter-disciplinary Collaboration” (1973) 7 Law and Society Review 561-583.
7 See D. Riesman, "Toward an Anthropological Science of Law and the Legal Profession" 
in his Individualism Reconsidered and Other Essays (1954).
8 See Roberts, "Introduction" in Law and the Family in Africa ed. S. Roberts (1977) and 
Twining, "Law and Anthropology: A Case Study of Inter-disciplinary Collaboration" 
(1973) 7 Law and Society Review 561. On the relationship between anthropologists and 
lawyers in Britain in particular, see Campbell and Wiles, "The Study of Law in Society 
in Britain," (1976) 10 Law and Society Review 547-578 at 564, which relies on A. 
Kuper, Anthropologists and Anthropology: The British School 1922-1972 (1973).
9 On this view of anthropology, see the two classic descriptions in S.F. Nadel, The 
Foundations o f Social Anthropology (1951) and J. Beattie, Other Cultures: Aims, 
Methods and Achievements in Social Anthropology (1964). Different positions concern­
ing contemporary anthropology and law are presented in J. Poirier, "Introduction à 
l'ethnologie de l'appareil juridique" in Ethnologie générale, ed. J. Poirier (1968) and E. 
Hill, "Law and Underdevelopment: Conceptualising Legal Formations in Peripheral 
States", presented at the Annual Conference of the British Sociological Association, 
University of Warwick, 9-12 April 1979. See also Roberts, "Law and the Study of 
Social Control in Small-Scale Societies" (1976) 39 Modern Law Review 663.
10 Thus, Roberts has argued that legal anthropological studies fall into one of two distinct 
schools: those that draw their basic concepts from Western Jurisprudence and concen­
trate on law as the subject of study, and those that reject Western jurisprudence as a 
source of concepts and concentrate on social control, disputing or other social processes 
deemed to be universal. See Roberts, ibid; and S. Roberts, Order and Dispute: An 
Introduction to Legal Anthropology (1979), chapters 2 and 11.
11 Among the discussions of the role of theory in anthropology, see R.A. Manners and D. 
Kaplan (eds.), Theory in Anthropology: A Sourcebook (1968) and I.C. Jarvie, The 
Revolution in Anthropology (1964). See also J.A. Brim and D.H. Spain, Research 
Design in Anthropology: Paradigms and Pragmatics in the Testing o f Hypotheses (1974) 
and R. Naroll and R. Cohen, A Handbook o f Method in Cultural Anthropology (1973). 
On the recent period, see the useful review by S.B. Orlner, Theory in Anthropology 




























































































ject; many have considered that dispute processes, for example, are a less eth­
nocentric, more cross-culturally valid subject of study than law.12
Any general impression that anthropological approaches to legal pro­
cesses have little to offer to academic legal studies is misleading, however, in 
at least two respects. First, as will be shown later, anthropological approaches 
today are extremely diverse, and many are concerned with western legal sys­
tems and subjects which have also preoccupied academic lawyers. Secondly, 
anthropological approaches to law and related processes raise certain funda­
mental questions concerning law and social science. These questions, of which 
some are posed more starkly by anthropological approaches than by other so­
cial sciences, have increasingly been debated by academic lawyers and 
theorists of law.
3. The Anthropology of Law
The historical separation between anthropology and academic legal 
studies has been influenced by the contrasting characteristics of the disciplines 
of law and anthropology, as well as by other institutional forces, such as the 
development of sociology in different countries13. Anthropological ap­
12 The most elaborate theoretical statement of this position is Abel, "A Comparative Theory 
of Dispute Institutions in Society" (1974) 8 Law and Society Review 217. See also 
Roberts, op. cit. n. 9.
13 The division of labour between sociology, concerned with western societies, and an­
thropology, focussing on non-western groups, is well-known, though out-dated and 
generally recognised to be increasingly irrelevant in contemporary studies; its intellectual 
foundations have always been shaky. Durkheim in France is the major, and exceptional, 
example of a sociologist whose work had a lasting influence on anthropological studies. 
See H. Lévy-Bruhl, "L'ethnologie juridique" in Ethnologie générale, ed. J. Poirier 
(1968), p. 1119; S. Lukes, Emile Durkheim, His life and Work: A Historical and Critical 
Study (1973), chap. 20; and D. Goddard, "Anthropology; the Limits of Functionalism” 
in Ideology and Social Science: Readings in Critical Social Theory, ed. R. Blackburn, 
1972). Examples of work in other disciplines strongly influenced by anthropological re­
search include M. Barkun, Law without Sanctions: Order in Primitive Societies and the 
World Community (1968) and D. Black, The Behaviour o f Law (1976). Some anthropo­
logical research discussed later in this paper suggests the common concerns and partial 




























































































proaches to law differ from those in psychology14 (but resemble those in 
economics or sociology) in that they are usually considered to constitute an 
established academic field. The anthropology of law is widely recognised as a 
subdiscipline of anthropology.'5  Its origins have been traced to 
Montesquieu16, but its foundations were laid by nineteenth century historical 
jurisprudence17 and cemented during the period of European imperialist ex­
pansion and colonialism.18 The anthropology of law reflects this legacy, but 
none the less its principal development is relatively recent.19 This develop­
ment has occurred primarily in the United States and secondarily on the 
European continent.20 For a variety of reasons, despite numerous important 
British contributions to the field,21 anthropological approaches to law have
14 Compare my discussion of the anthropology of law with S. Lloyd-Bostock, 
"Psychology and the Law: A Critical Review of Research and Practice" (1981) 8 British 
Journal o f Law and Society 1-28.
16 See, e.g., Nader, "The Anthropological Study of Law" (1965) 67 (6) (2) American 
Anthropologist (Special Publication on "The Ethnography of Law", ed. L Nader), 3-32; 
D.D. Whitney and C. Kobryn, "Ignorance of Legal Anthropology Is No Excuse, or Is 
It? - A Survey of Introductory Cultural Anthropology Textbooks", Association for 
Political and Legal Anthropology Occasional Paper No.3 (March 1981), (1981) 5 (2) 
APLA Newsletter and Occasional Papers 1; and C. Greenhouse, "Courses in Political 
and Legal Anthropology: The APLA Curriculum Survey" Association for Political and 
Legal Anthropology Occasional Paper No.4 (July 1981), (1981) 5 (2) APLA Newsletter 
and Occasional Papers 1. These sources are useful indications of the general point but 
nonetheless are limited to English-language literature and the last two papers to the 
United States and Canada.
16 See Levy-Bruhl, op.cit n. 12, p. 1116; and Abel, op.cit. n. 11, p.219.
17 The basic works were H.S. Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History 
o f Society and Its Relation to Modern Ideas (1861) and J.-J. Bachofen, Das Mutterrecht 
(1861).
18 See e.g., Kuper, op.cit. n.7; and Gough, "Anthropology and Imperialism" (1968) 19 (11) 
Monthly Review 12-27. For recent discussions, see D. Hymes (ed.) Reinventing  
Anthropology (1969) and T. Asad (ed.). Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter 
(1975).
19 Thus, Twining recounts Hoebel's difficulty in finding an anthropologist to supervise his 
postgraduate research on Cheyenne law in the 1930s; see Twining, Karl Llewellyn and 
the Realist Movement (1973), pp. 154-155.
20 On anthropological research elsewhere, see the Newsletter of the IUAES Commission 
on Folk Law and Legal Pluralism. The first textbook in French is N. Rouland, 
Anthropologie juridique (1988); see also N. Rouland, L'anthropologie juridique (1990) 
and (1990) Journal o f Legal Pluralism, special issue on 'L'anthropologie juridique fran­
cophone', eds. F. Snyder and E. Le Roy. See also the issues of the Internationales 
Jahrbuch fiir Rechtsantropologie, published by VWGO-Verlag, Vienna.
21 A comprehensive list would include not only work discussed later in this paper but also 




























































































remained on the margins of both legal and anthropological scholarship in the 
United Kingdom.22
After the publication of Sir Henry Maine's Ancient Law in 1861,23 a 
small number of classic anthropological monographs provided the baseline for 
contemporary legal anthropology. Malinowski's Crime and Custom in Savage 
Society (1926) and Llewellyn and Hoebel's The Cheyenne Way (1941 )24 had a 
fundamental effect on methods of research. Malinowski's short study, a small 
part of the published corpus of his research on the Trobriand Islands,25 was a 
radical innovation at the time in being based on extensive fieldwork, which 
since then has been considered a precondition of any valid anthropological 
study of law.26 In addition, Malinowski insisted on the necessity of emphasis­
ing function rather than form, and of giving priority to the cultural or ideo­
logical categories of the actors themselves,27 thus partly escaping the
chapter 11 ("Social Sanctions") and chapter 12 ("Primitive Law"); E.E. Evans-Pritchard, 
Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande (1937) and The Nuer (1940); H. Cory, 
Sukuma Law and Custom (1953); I. Hogbin, Law and Order in Polynesia (1934); and M. 
Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis o f the Concepts o f Pollution and Taboo 
(1966).
22 See Campbell and Wiles, op cit. n.7; Gulliver, "Preface", in Cross-Examinations: 
Essays in Memory o f Max Gluckman, ed. P.H. Gulliver (1978); Roberts, op.cit n.7.
25 The continued influence of Maine's work, until recently, was especially apparent in Max 
Gluckman's writings. See, e.g, his Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society (1965) and 
The Ideas in Barotse Jurisprudence (1965); of the latter, Gluckman wrote that "I am not 
sure but that 'Footnotes to Sir Henry Maine's Ancient Law' would be a more accurate ti­
tle for this book" (p.xvi).
24 Llewellyn and Hoebel’s book was sub-titled Conflict and Case Law in Primitive 
Jurisprudence.
25 Other well-known works include Argonauts o f the Western Pacific (1922) and Coral 
Gardens and Their Magic (1935). Malinowski's work is discussed in Man and Culture: 
An Evaluation o f the Work o f Bronislaw Malinowski, ed. R.Firth (1957), as well as in 
more recent works which cannot be considered here.
26 And indeed in any valid anthropological study. For discussions of Malinowski’s contri­
bution to anthropological methods, see Kaberry, "Malinowski's Contribution to Field­
work Methods and the Writing of Ethnography" and Leach, "The Epistemological 
Background to Malinowski's Empiricism" in Firth, ed., op.cit. n. 24, pp. 71-91 and 119- 
137, respectively.
27 Thus, in Coral Gardens and Their Magic, Malinowski argued that "the final goal, of 
which the Ethnographer should never lose sight... is, briefly, to grasp the native's point 
of view, his relation to life, to realise his vision of his world” (p.25, E.P. Dutton (New 
York) edition, 1961). See also Malinowski, "A New Instrument for the Interpretation of 
Law - Especially Primitive" (1942) 51 Yale Law Journal 1237 and his "Introduction" to 
Hogbin, op.cit. supra n. 20. For criticisms and a discussion of changes in Malinowski's 




























































































ethnocentric misuse of Western legal ideas and institutions in analysing social 
relations elsewhere. The Cheyenne Way, for which Llewellyn, an American 
legal realist, and Hoebel, a cultural anthropologist, elicited oral accounts of 
nineteenth century disputes, stands as the prime example to date of 
interdisciplinary cooperation in the anthropology of law.28 It was the first 
systematic anthropological attempt to study law by a careful analysis of 
"trouble-cases", which has since become a standard method of research.
Among other studies published before the mid-1960s, the most signifi­
cant in the development of the subject in English-speaking countries have been 
those by Schapera, Hoebel, Gluckman, Bohannan, Pospisil and Gulliver. 
Schapera's A Handbook o f Tswana Law and Custom (1938), prepared at the 
request of the then Bechuanaland Administration, was a clear, precise 
recording of 'customary' rules, based not only on idealised accounts by in­
formants but also on actual disputes.29 Hoebel's The Law of Primitive Man 
(1954) sought to arrange various groups in an evolutionary sequence, embrac­
ing social organisation, culture and law, and to elucidate the basic jural postu­
lates underlying the law of each group.30 The Judicial Process among the 
Barotse (1955) by Max Gluckman was the first published anthropological
Schapera, "Malinowski's Theories of Law" in Firth, ed., op.cit. n. 24, pp. 15-31 and 
139-155, respectively.
28 See the writings by Twining, op.cit. supra n. 4. A good recent example is J.L. 
Comaroff and S. Roberts, Rules and Processes: The Cultural Logic o f Dispute in an 
African Context (1981). Several scholars have formal training in both law and 
anthropology.
29 Schapera also provided major studies of legislation in Tribal Legislation among the 
Tswana o f the Bechuanaland Protectorate (1943) and Tribal Innovators: Tswana Chiefs 
and Social Change 1795-1940 (1970). A select bibliography of Schapera's writings in le­
gal anthropology is given in (1977) 21 Journal o f African Law 124.
30 A bibliography of Hoebel’s writing to 1973 appears in (1973) 7 Law and Society Review 
787. Another recent evolutionary study is A.S. Diamond, Primitive Law, Past and 
Present (1971). In sociology, see L.T.Hobhouse, G.C. Wheeler and M. Ginsburg, The 
Material Culture and Social Institutions o f the Simpler Peoples: An Essay in Correlation 
(1915, reprinted 1965). For a useful correction of some conceptions of legal evolution, see 
Moore, "Legal Liability and Evolutionary Interpretation: Some Aspects of Strict 
Liability, Self-Help and Collective Responsibility" in The Allocation o f Responsibility, 
ed. M. Gluckman (1972). See also A. Podolefsky, 'Population Density, Land Tenure 





























































































analysis, based on observed cases, of judicial reasoning in a non-Western so­
cial group, here the remnant of the Lozi state in the Barotse kingdom in 
Zambia.31 Analysing dispute cases and concepts of jural processes in an 
acephalous social group in Nigeria, Bohannan's Justice and Judgement among 
the Tiv (1957) argued persuasively that it was often difficult, if not impossi­
ble, to understand other societies in terms of Western conceptions of law.32 In 
Kapajuku Papuans and Their Law (1958) and other writings, Pospisil elabo­
rated the notion that every society comprised a multiplicity of legal systems, 
often hierarchically arranged and always dependent on the number of func­
tioning subgroups in the society.33 Gulliver's Social Control in an African 
Society (1963) compared forms of out-of-court dispute settlement among the 
Arusha of Tanzania, emphasising the importance of viewing disputes as part 
of more general social processes.34
Though differing many respects, these studies had certain features in 
common. All concerned a single ethnic group, which was deemed to be a 
relatively homogenous unit, capable of being isolated, as a "society", for pur­
poses of analysis. They were mainly ahistorical, ethnographic descriptions, 
based on inductive empiricism and using some form of the case method. Most 
relied, explicitly or implicitly, on Western conceptions of law, and they con­
sidered disputes as the main index of law or its primary locus. Though con­
31 See also Gluckman, op.cit. n. 21. A select bibliography of Gluckman's extensive writ­
ings is given in Cross-Examinations: Essays in Memory o f Max Gluckman, ed. P.H. 
Gulliver (1978), pp. 155-157. See also Firth, "Max Gluckman, 1911-1975" in (1975) 61 
Proceedings o f the British Academy 479. On Gluckman's continued influence, see 
LeRoy, "L'anthropologie juridique anglo-saxonne et l'héritage scientifique de Max 
Gluckman: Un point de vue français", (1979) 17 African Law Studies 53.
32 See also his Social Anthropology (1963), chapter 17; '"Land', 'Tenure' and Land- 
Tenure" in African Agrarian Systems, ed. D. Biebuyck, 1963) and "Ethnography and 
Comparison in Legal Anthropology" in Law in Culture and Society, ed. L. Nader 
(1969).
33 See also his Anthropology o f Law: A Comparative Theory (1971); The Ethnology o f 
Law (1972; Addison-Wesley Modular Publications, 12, pp. 1-40); and "Legally Induced 
Culture Change in New Guinea" in The Imposition o f Law, eds. S. Burman and B. 
Harrell-Bond (1979).
34 See also his Neighbours and Networks: The Idiom o f Kinship in Social Action among 




























































































ducted during the colonial period, by and large they abstracted from the pro­
cesses of colonial domination, as well as from the profound economic and so­
cial changes occurring during that period. They were generally functionalist 
in orientation and concerned with the maintenance of social order.35 Except 
for the works by Malinowski and Gulliver, they considered law primarily as a 
framework rather than as a process.36
These monographs established standards of research method, ethno­
graphic description and limited theoretical generalisation that have profoundly 
affected contemporary anthropological research. Until recently, however, 
with the exception of Malinowski's book and several other studies, they had 
relatively little influence on the European continent.37 Research in the 
Netherlands, for example, concentrated mainly on practical and theoretical is­
sues raised by colonial policies in Indonesia. It encompassed an immense lit­
erature on legal pluralism and adat law, including the work by Van 
Vollenhoven in Leiden.38 In France, anthropological approaches to law were
35 The maintenance of social order has been a continuing theme in legal anthropology. See, 
e.g., M. Gluckman, Custom and Conflict in Africa (1956) and Roberts, Order and 
Dispute, op.cit. n.9. Goddard, op.cit. n. 12 is among the many criticisms of this focus.
36 Nader and Yngvesson, "On Studying the Ethnography of Law and Its Consequences” in 
Handbook o f Social and Cultural Anthropology, ed. J.J. Honigman (1973), pp. 884- 
892. The distinction between framework and process, deriving from Durkheim and 
Malinowski, has been partly reformulated in terms of a distinction between rights and 
interests. For different criticisms of these dichotomies, see Hamnett, "Introduction" in 
Social Anthropology and Law, ed. I Hamnett (1977), pp. 8-10; LeRoy, op.cit. n. 30; 
and Comaroff and Roberts, op. cit., n. 27.
37 Among the exceptions were Radcliffe-Brown, Evans-Pritchard and Douglas, op.cit 
n.20. An indication of the general situation, however, the converse of Anglo-American 
neglect of continental research, is Lévy-Bruhl's assertion, written about 1963, that 
"l'ethnographie juridique est restée relativement peu dévelopée dans les pays de langue 
anglaise" ; see Lévy-Bruhl, op.cit n. 11, p. 1118. The proofs of that paper were corrected 
shortly before his death in 1964; see Poirer, "Preface" in Ethnologie générale, op.cit. n. 
12, p. xv. In contrast, the bibliography prepared by R. Verdier for a course on legal an­
thropology at the University of Paris in 1969 included numerous references to recent 
work in Anglo-American anthropology of law.
38 A translation of part of Van Vollenhoven's work was published as Van Vollenhoven on 
Indonesian Adat Law -Selections from Het Adatrecht van Nederlandsch-Indie, ed. J.F. 
Holleman (1981). For an earlier discussion of Van Vollenhoven's influence, see Korn, 
"Past and Future of Indonesian Adat Law" in The Future o f Customary Law in Africa 
(1956). In addition to Van Vollenhoven, Schapera and later Llewellyn and Hoebel influ­
enced the work of J.F. Holleman at Leiden; see Holleman, "Trouble-Cases and Trouble­




























































































heavily influenced by Durkheimian sociology and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl's theory 
of primitive mentality,39 though their more immediate forebearers are 
Marcel Mauss, Durkheim's nephew and student,40 and Henri Lévy-Bruhl, 
Lucien Lévy-Bruhl's son.41 French research and teaching on anthropology of 
law dates at least from the 1930s; but it was Henri Levy-Bruhl's achievement 
to establish the sociology of law in the Paris law faculty, which led subse­
quently to systematic courses in African law, including legal anthropology.43 
These (and other) different continental traditions and Anglo-American ap­
proaches have begun to converge only since the early 1970s.
Using several earlier reviews of the literature and other partial synthe­
ses43, one may roughly distinguish four overlapping yet distinct periods in the
Society Review 585. Holleman’s major writings include Shona Customary Law (1952); 
Chief; Council and Commissioner (1969); and Issues in African Law (1974).
39 See Lévy-Bruhl, op.cit. n. 12, pp. 1119-1120. The particular contribution of Lucien 
Lévy-Bruhl lay not in his specific theories but in posing the question as to the universal 
validity of Western categories and emphasising the conceptual and symbolic aspects of 
human thought, according to R. Verdier, "Anthropologie juridique: Sa position dans les 
Sciences anthropologique. (3) Anthropologie sociale", Cours d'ethnologie juridique, 
Université de Paris, 1969, p.4.
40 Mauss's lectures were published posthumously as Manuel d  Ethnographie (1947; 2nd 
edition 1967); chapter 7 concerns legal phenomena. Among his most important writings 
in legal anthropology are The Gift: Forms and Functions o f Exchange in Archaic 
Societies (trans. I Cunnison, 1970; orig.pub. 1923-24); "Essai sur les variations saison­
nières des sociétés Eskimos: Etude de morphologie sociale" in Sociologie et 
Anthropologie (1950; 4th edition 1968), pp. 389-476; and (with E. Durkheim) Primitive 
Classification (trans R. Needham, 1963; orig.pub. 1903).
41 See my "Introduction" and "Partial Bibliography of the Works of Henri Lévy-Bruhl” in 
Lévy-Bruhl, "Juridical Ethnology” (trans C.J. Snyder), Yale Law School Program in 
Law and Modernization Working Paper No.16.
43 Ibid., pp. iii-iv. M. Alliot, Lévy-Bruhl's successor in the Chair of Juridical Ethnology in 
Paris, established the Laboratoire d'Anthropologie Juridique in 1964-65. See Ibid., pp. 
iv-v and the article by Alliot's successor, LeRoy, op.cit. supra n.3. For a more recent 
discussion of French research, see LeRoy, "Pour une anthropogie du droit" (1978) 1 
Revue Interdisciplinaire d'Etudes Juridiques 71. Two recent surveys are N. 
Rouland, Anthropologie juridique (1988) and N. Rouland, L'anthropologie juridique 
(1989).
43 Earlier partial reviews of the literature include: Hoebel, "Law and Anthropology", (1946) 
32 Virginia Law Review 835; Bohannan, "Anthropology and Law" in Horizons o f 
Anthropology, ed. S. Tax (1964); Nader, op.cit. n. 14; M. Gluckman, Politics Law and 
Ritual in Tribal Society (1967); Koch, "Law and Anthropology: Thoughts on 
Interdisciplinary Research",(1969) 4 Law and Society Review 11; Moore, "Law and 
Anthropology” in Biennial Review o f Anthropology, ed. B.J. Siegel (1969), reprinted in 
S.F. Moore, Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach (1978), chap. 7; J. Poirier, 
'The Current State of Legal Ethnology and its Future Tasks', (1970) 22 International 
Social Science Journal 476; Cox and Drever, "Some Recent Trends in the Ethnography 




























































































development of the field: the publication of the major empirical monographs, 
mainly in English, before the early 1960s; a shift, especially in the United 
States after 1965, towards the study of dispute settlement and of law as a pro­
cess; the gradual elaboration during the 1970s of a plurality of approaches, all 
marked by more explicit concern with theory and greater attention to the role 
of the state; and, most recently, the development of a more historical empha­
sis, on the one hand, and a focus on legal pluralism, on the other hand. In each 
period, of course, diverse strands and traditions co-existed, and scholars drew 
selectively on earlier work, often including their own, for elaboration and 
special emphasis. This crude periodisation gives perhaps too much emphasis to 
literature in English. However, it also suggests, rightly, that Anglo-American 
approches have been the main beneficiary of recent trends towards the inter­
nationalisation of the subject.
Abel, op.cit. n. 11; Collier, "Legal Processes" in Annual Review o f Anthropology, eds. 
B.J. Siegel, A.R. Beals and S.A. Tyler (1975); M.B. Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An 
Introduction to Colonial and Neo-colonial Laws (1975), chap. 1; Roberts, op.cit. n. 7; 
Koch, "The Anthropology of Law and Order" in Horizons o f Anthropology, ed. S. Tax 
and L.G. Freeman (2nd ed. 1977); Roberts, op.cit. n. 9, chap. 11; D.H. Dwyer, 
'Substance and Process; Reappraising the Premises of the Anthropology of Law', 
(1979) 4 Dialectical Anthropology 309; Snyder, "Law and Development in the Light of 
Dependency Theory", (1980) 14 Law and Society Review 723 at pp. 775-779; J. Starr 
and J.F. Collier, 'Historical Studies of Legal Change’, (1987) 28 Current Anthropology 
367. Collections of readings on legal anthropology include: Nader (ed), op.cit. n. 13; P. 
Bohannan (ed.), Law and Warfare: Studies in the Anthropology o f Conflict (1967); 
Nader (ed), op.cit. n. 31; Gluckman (ed), op.cit. n.29; (1973) 7 Law and Society 
Review; A.L. Epstein (ed.), Contention and Dispute: Aspects o f Law and Social 
Controls in Melanesia (1974); Hamnett (ed.), op.cit. n.35; (1977) 21 Journal o f African 
Law; Gulliver (ed.), op.cit. n. 30; L. Nader and H.F. Todd, Jr (eds), The Disputing 
Process - Law in Ten Societies (1978); K.F. Koch (ed.). Access to Justice, Vol. IV, The 
Anthropological Perspective - Patterns o f Conflict Management: Essays in the 
Ethnography o f Law (1979); P. Sack and J. Aleck (eds), Law and Anthropology (1992). 
See also L. Nader, K. F. Koch and B. Cox, "The Ethnography of Law: A 



























































































T h e  S tu d y  o f  D is p u te  P ro c e s se s
1. A Central Theme
In 1965, Laura Nader summarised previous research and proposed new 
directions.44 Building especially on earlier studies by Malinowski, Gulliver, 
Colson,45 Turner46 and Bailey,47 48she suggested that anthropologists should 
place legal processes more squarely in their social context and aim at empiri­
cal and explanatory generalisations. As a basis for achieving these objectives, 
she proposed the following assumptions: 1) there is a limited scope of disputes 
for any particular society, 2) a limited number of formal procedures are used 
in human societies in the prevention of and/or settlement of disputes; 3) there 
will be a choice in the number and modes of settlement .48 
These assumptions reflected changes then occurring elsewhere in anthropol­
ogy, especially by a greater emphasis on processes, transactions and individual 
choices;49 but they formed the basis of a substantially new approach in legal 
anthropology. They underlay a large number of later studies, especially (but 
not only) those undertaken by Nader's students in the Berkeley Village Law 
Project between 1965 and 1975.50
44 Nader, op.cit. n.14.
45 Especially Colson, "Social Control and Vengeance in Plateau Tonga Society", (1953) 23 
Africa 199.
46 V.W. Turner, Schism and Continuity in an African Society: A Study ofNdemhu Village 
Life (1957).
47 F.G. Bailey, Caste and the Economic Frontier (1958) and Tribe, Caste and Nation 
(1960). In these books, Bailey presented ideas that he subsequently developed in a num­
ber of works.
48 Nader, op.cit. n. 14, p.23.
49 See especially F. Barth, "Models of Social Organization", Occasional Paper 23, Royal 
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland (1966); M.J. Swartz, V.W. Turner 
and A. Tuden (eds), Political Anthropology (1966); and van Velsen, "The Extended-Case 
Method and Situational Analysis" in The Craft o f Social Anthropology, ed. A.L. Epstein 
(1967). These and other influences, especially Malinowski's work, on legal anthropol­
ogy are discussed in Nader and Yngvesson, op.cit. n.35 and in Nader and Todd, 
"Introduction: The Disputing Process" in Nader and Todd (eds.), op.cit n. 42.
59 See Nader, "Preface" and Nader and Todd, "Introduction; The Disputing Process" in 
Nader and Todd (eds.), op.cit. n. 42. Under Nader's direction, fourteen graduate stu­
dents completed doctoral dissertations on legal anthropology during this decade; essays 
by ten of them are included in Nader and Todd (eds.), op.cit. supra n.42. See also K.F. 




























































































This approach took dispute settlement or dispute processes as its central 
theme; the latter term denoted clearly that the outcome of disputes was not 
necessarily a firm resolution of the issues ostensibly at staked1 In this view, 
disputing displaced law as the subject of study, and the dispute, rather than 
law, formed the major theoretical concept. Gulliver's 1969 definition of a dis­
pute as the public assertion, usually through some standard procedures, of an 
initially dyadic disagreement was widely accepted.52 Within this framework, 
definitions of law were often considered to be unnecessary, not only because 
they were frequently thought to be inevitably ethnocentric, but also because 
this definitional exercise itself was deemed theoretically sterile.53 Similarly, 
the study of substantive concepts and rules was of secondary importance,54 
being subordinated to the analysis of procedures, strategies and processes, 
which obviously were not limited to bureaucratic institutions such as courts.
By analysing disputes as social processes through an extended case
method or situational analysis,55 this approach shifted the main enquiry from
(1974); J. Starr, Dispute and Settlement in Rural Turkey: An Ethnography o f Law (1978); 
and C. Witty, Mediation and Society: Conflict Management in Lebanon (1980). Nader's 
own research is presented also in her Harmony Ideology: Justice and Control in a 
Zapotec Village (1990).
51 Though then retaining the expression "dispute settlement", Gulliver was among the first 
to make this point clearly in his "Case Studies of Law in Non-Western Societies: 
Introduction” in Nader (ed.), op.cit. n. 31, pp. 14-15.
52 Ibid., p.14. Some of the problems inherent in this definition, especially concerning the 
requirement that a conflict reach the public arena in order to qualify as a "dispute", are 
discussed in Epstein, "Introduction" in Epstein (ed.), op.cit. n. 42, p.9 and in Starr, "A 
Pre-Law Stage in Rural Turkish Disputes Negotiations" in Gulliver (ed.), op.cit. n.30.
53 See, e.g, Gulliver, op.cit. n.50, pp. 12-13; Koch, "The Anthropology of Law: Notes on 
Interdisciplinary Research", op.cit. n. 42, p. 12; Abel, op.cit. n. 11, pp. 221-224; 
Roberts, op.cit. n. 9, chapter 2.
54 See, e.g., Abel, "Law and Anthropology" (Review of I. Hamnett, ed.. Social 
Anthropology and Law, (1980) 28 American Journal o f Comparative Law 128 at p. 131. 
This was primarily an Anglo-American phenomenon; in that literature, the sole major ex­
ception prior to 1975 was L.A. Fallers, Law Without Precedent: Legal Ideas in Action in 
the Courts o f Colonial Busoga (1969).
55 The case method is often viewed as the standard research method in legal anthropology. 
Anthropologists' conceptions of this method, however, differ substantially from those of 
lawyers. In addition, the former are in fact diverse, have changed substantially since the 
early 1960s and have recently been attacked on the grounds, inter alia, that the study of 
cases, however defined, is inadequate for some purposes and always needs to be sup­
plemented by other research methods. For discussions of these issues, and especially the 
important shift in the conception of the case method since the late 1960s, see: Gluckman, 




























































































social organisation to processes and also from groups to networks of individ­
uals. It emphasised the actions of parties in disputes just as much as those of 
negotiators or adjudicators. Hence it aimed to map the perceptions of individ­
ual disputants, identify their options and strategies, and understand the cul­
tural meanings and rationalisations of social action.56 Especially in the context 
of underdeveloped countries, this perspective gave special emphasis to the role 
of political brokers in channelling individual choices, mediating between cul­
tures and maintaining or eroding legal pluralism.57
Studies by anthropologists using these and similar approaches to dispute 
processes were not limited to Africa, Latin America or Asia. Though not con­
centrating on cases, Spradley used participant observation, formal interview­
ing and ethnosemantic methods to analyse marginalised urban nomads' per­
ceptions of and relations to courts in Seattle, Washington.58 Mather briefly 
reviewed ethnographic studies of American trial courts; she suggested that the 
utility of an ethnographic approach lay in raising and answering questions 
about different groups' knowledge and perceptions of law, about informal
Review 1; Gluckman, Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society, op.cit. n. 21, pp. 235- 
242; van Velsen, op.cit. n. 48; Epstein, "The Case Method in the Field of Law" in The 
Craft o f Social Anthropology, op.cit. n. 48; Abel, "Customary Law of Wrongs in 
Kenya; An Essay in Research Method", (1969) i7 American Journal o f Comparative Law 
573; Gluckman, "Limitations of the Case-Method in the Study of Tribal Law", (1973) 7 
Law and Society Review 611; Holleman, "Trouble-Cases and Trouble-less Cases in the 
Study of Customary Law and Legal Reform", op.cit. n. 37; Abel, "Reply to Max 
Gluckman", (1973) 8 Law and Society Review 157; Nader and Yngvesson, op.cit. n. 
35, pp. 892-902; Hooker, op.cit. n. 42; van Binsbergen, "Law in the Context of Nkoya 
Society" in Law and the Family in Africa, op.cit. n. 7; and Nader and Todd, op.cit. n. 
49. Other, complementary methods are discussed in Snyder, "The Use of Oral Data in 
Legal Anthropology: A Senegalese Example”, (1973) 17 Journal of African Law 196; 
B.E. Harrell-Bond, Modem Marriage in Sierra Leone: A Study o f the Professional
Group (1975), pp. 296-332; and the essays in R. Luckham (ed.), Law and Social 
Enquiry: Case Studies o f Research (1981).
56 For example, see J.F. Collier, Law and Social Change in Zinacantan (1973), p.244; J. 
Starr, op. cit. n. 49.
57 See Collier, "Political Leadership and Legal Change in Zinacantan", (1976) 11 Law and 
Society Review 131; Freeman, "Conflict, Law and Lawyers in Chiapas, Mexico" in 
Koch (ed.), op.cit. n. 42.




























































































social norms and about the relationships between courts and other dispute 
processes.59
While unified by a concern with dispute processes and an emphasis on 
individual actions and perceptions, this approach tended in fact to be theoreti­
cally eclectic,60 though some writers have tried to place it squarely within an 
empirical interactionist tradition.61 It was not surprising, therefore, that 
developments in the study of dispute processes accentuated differences 
between various theoretical positions and also gave rise to new distinctions. 
Perhaps inevitably reflecting changes in the political and economic context of 
scholarship, these developments fragmented what might have appeared previ­
ously to be a fairly uniform approach to dispute processes. In doing so, they 
clarified the theoretical and political assumptions that underlay earlier work 
and, sometimes, they resulted in greater theoretical sophistication. Some of 
these trends may be mentioned briefly.
2. Disputes: Processes and Processing
Despite an emphasis on conflict and disputing as universal processes, 
anthropological work on dispute processes has been mainly concerned with 
micro-level studies of the management of conflict and the maintenance of or­
der. 2 *62 Although some legal anthropologists have contributed to the analysis of
59 Mather, "Ethnography and the Study of Trial Courts" in J.A. Gardiner (ed.) Public Law 
and Public Policy (1977).
60 See Nader and Todd, op.cit, n.49, p.3.
61 See Starr, "Different Theories in the Anthropological Study of Law: A Response to 
Professor Pospisil", (1980) 2 Zeitschrift fu r  Rechtssoziologie 253-259 (reply to 
Pospisil,Review of Starr, Dispute and Settlement in Rural Turkey: An Ethnography o f 
Law (1978), 2 Zeitschrift fu r Rechtssoziologie 249); Starr, Review of S. Roberts, Order 
and Dispute: An Introduction to Legal Anthropology (1979), (1981) 9 International 
Journal o f the Sociology o f Law 120.
6^ See Roberts, op.cit. n. 8; Koch, Sodergren an Campbell, "Political and Psychological 
Correlates of Conflict Management: A Cross-Cultural Study", (1976) 10 Law and 
Society Review 443-466. Recent studies of the creation and maintenance of a moral or­
der, some of which overlap with work on ideology, include C.J. Greenhouse, Praying 
fo r Justice: Faith, Order and Community in an American Town (1986); D.M. Engel, 
'Law, Time and Community', (1987) 21 Law and Society Review 605; see also C.J. 
Greenhouse, 'Just in Time: Temporality and the Cultural Legitimation of Law', (1989) 




























































































sources of social conflict,65 most have concentrated instead on the character­
istics of disputes as processes and/or of the procedural forms by which dis­
putes are handled. Following Felstiner,64 I use the expression 'dispute pro­
cessing' to refer to the latter.
The distinction between dispute processes and dispute processing is use­
ful here, even though procedural forms are often analysed by anthropologists 
as processes themselves, and even though the course of a dispute and the 
means by which an outcome is reached are often intimately related. On the 
one hand, the expressions identify two different aspects of ethnographic and 
theoretical work in legal anthropology: one concerned with social relation­
ships in processes of conflict, and the other with the more or less standardised 
procedures for reaching an outcome. On the other hand, the contrast between 
the dynamic and bureaucratic connotations of the terms "processes" and "pro­
cessing", respectively, suggests another important point, which raises numer­
ous issues concerning the relationship between scholarship and politics.65 
Though addressed to an increasing variety of issues in anthropological and 
sociological theory, processual studies have been primarily academic in orien­
tation, usually ethnographic or theoretical in purpose and addressed to a social 
science audience. In contrast, research on dispute processing has tended to be 
more instrumentalist, often concerned with the implementation of practical, 
procedural reforms, and sometimes abstracting politics and social relations 
from the analysis of procedures.66 Partly for this reason, they have been gen­
erally of more interest than processual studies to academic lawyers.
65 Collier, op.cit. n.42 discusses some studies; see also LeVine, "Anthropology and the 
Study of Conflict: An Introduction", (1961) 5 Journal o f Conflict Resolution 3-15; and 
A. R. Beals and B.J. Siegel, Divisiveness and Social Conflict: An Anthropological 
Approach (1966).
64 Felstiner, "Influences of Social Organisation on Dispute Processing", (1974) 9 Law and 
Society Review 63.
65 Some of these issues are discussed in papers in Luckham (ed.), op.cit. n. 54.
66 See also Abel, "Conservative Conflict and the Reproduction of Capitalism: The Role of 




























































































Anthropologists' definitions frequently postulated that a conflict became 
a dispute when placed in the public arena. This definition facilitated research 
on individual decision-making and strategies. Within a processual framework 
it also raised questions concerning the effects of prior, pre-dispute relations 
between parties on the subsequent public confrontation. In exploring these 
questions, the Berkeley Village Project distinguished three phases in the life 
history of disputes: the preconflict or grievance stage, the conflict stage and 
the dispute stage.67 Though most studies concern the dispute stage, some writ­
ers analysed the earlier phases. Yngvesson's study of a Swedish fishing village 
showed that conflicts involving community members were marked by a "non­
action" or "cooling” period during which the circumstances, relations between 
the parties and others and the consequences of formal reactions were consid­
ered.68 She later argued that such periods of "bracketed structural time" 
formed part of dispute processes elsewhere, including an American court.6  ̂
Starr's work on rural Turkish disputing elicited many cases of dyadic nego­
tiation, in which grievances were often not brought to a public arena. 
Analysing the correlations between social rank and forms of settlement, she 
suggested that in mral Turkey "[pjublic confrontation ... is the true forum of 
the powerless". 70 Other work, also emphasising the litigant's perspective, 
related individual choice-making to broader social changes. Thus, Nader sug­
gested that, in countries such as the United States, individuals often elaborated 
extra-judicial dispute processes in direct response to the changing functions
67 Nader and Todd op.cit. n. 49, pp. 14-15; see also P.H. Gulliver, Disputes and 
Negotiations: A Cross-Cultural Perspective (1979), pp. 268-270.
68 Yngvesson, "Responses to Grievance Behaviour: Extended Cases in a Fishing 
Community", (1976) 3 American Ethnologist 353; and Yngvesson, "The Atlantic 
Fisherman" in Nader and Todd (eds.), op.cit. n.42.
69 Yngvesson, "The Reasonable Man and the Unreasonable Gossip: On the Flexibility of 
(Legal) Concepts and the Elasticity of (Legal) Time" in Gulliver (ed.), op.cit. 
n.30. These insights on the processual character of disputing have been developed fur­
ther in W.L.F. Felstiner, R.L. Abel and A. Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation 
of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming ...', (1980-81) 15 Law and Society Review 
671; L. Mather and B. Yngvesson, 'Language, Audience and the Transformation of 
Disputes', (1980-81) 15 Law and Society Review 775.




























































































and increasing bureaucratisation of state law and institutions.71 Using ideal- 
typical constructs of tribal society and modern society as a basis for hypothe­
ses concerning litigant behaviour, Abel argued that the interaction of social 
structure institutional structure produces patterns of litigation.72 *
Forms of dispute processing have been the subject of a great deal of re­
search and controversy. This interest formed a natural part of studies of dis­
pute processes, was consistent with lawyers' with courts and administrative 
agencies and was fuelled by governments' preoccupations with informal alter­
natives to courts. Theoretical work by anthropologists was stimulated partly 
by sociological theories;75 Gulliver's (1963) conception of the political and 
judicial modes as two ideal, polar types of processes;74 Bohannan's (1967) 
distinction between law and warfare as two basic forms of conflict resolu­
tion;75 and Abel's partial synthesis of the literature.76 It concluded that any 
typology that distinguishes simply between judicial and political forms of pro­
cessing was inadequate, because both norms and power are pervasive elements 
in all dispute processes everywhere.77
71 See Nader, "The Direction of Law and the Development of Extra-Judicial Processes in 
Nation State Societies" in Gulliver (ed.), op.cit. n. 30.
72 Abel, "Theories of Litigation in Society: 'Modern' Dispute Institutions in 'Tribal' 
Society and Tribal' Institutions in 'Modem' Society as Alternative Legal Forms" in 
Alternative Rechtsformen und Altemativen zum Recht, eds. E. Blankenburg, E. Klausa 
and H. Rottleuthner (1979) (6 Jahrbuchfiir Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie) 165-191; 
and Abel, "Western Courts in Non-Western Settings: Patterns of Court Use in Colonial 
and Neo-Colonial Africa" in Burman and Harrell-Bond (eds.), op.cit n. 32. On litiga­
tion, see generally J. Griffiths, 'The General Theory of Litigation: A First Step', (1983) 
5 ZeitschriftfUr Rechtssoziologie 145 and sources cited there.
75 E.g., Aubert, "Competition and Dissensus: Two Types of Conflict Resolution", (1963) 7
Journal o f Conflict Resolution 26-42; and Eckhoff, "The Mediator, the Judge and the 
Administrator in Conflict Resolution", (1967) 10 Acta Sociologica 148.
74 P.H. Gulliver, Social Control in an African Society: A Study o f the Arusha, Agricultural 
Masai o f Northern Tanganyika (1963), pp. 297-301.
75 Bohannan, "Introduction" in Bohannan(ed.). op.cit. n. 42.
76 Abel, op.cit. n. 11.
77 The debates concerning this typology may be traced in: Gulliver, loc.cit. n. 73; Moore, 
"Politics, Procedures and Norms in Changing Chagga Law", (1969) 40 Africa 321; 





























































































Proposing an alternative typology, Nader in 1969 advocated the 
comparison of procedural styles based on clusters of contrasting features.7** 
However, most scholars preferred typologies based on fewer, more precise 
and more institutionally derived criteria. Reconsidering Bohannan's 
conception, Roberts suggested a distinction between fighting and settlement- 
directed talking as two basic forms, the latter comprising several different 
types.78 9 Danet rearranged Roberts' categories into seven different types. She 
classified physical violence, appeals to the supernatural and the use of magical 
procedures and avoidance or ostracism as relatively nonverbal modes of 
processing disputes; shaming, reconciliation rituals, verbal contests and 
settlement-directed, fact-oriented talking were relatively verbal modes.80 
Using different criteria, Koch distinguished six types of procedure based on, 
first, the presence or absence of a third party and the mode of its intervention 
and, second, the nature of the outcome; avoidance, negotiation and coercion 
were dyadic procedures, while mediation, arbitration and adjudication were 
triadic.81 Gulliver himself, though recognising the existence of other 
settlement forms, concentrated primarily on elaborating a distinction between 
negotiation and adjudication as the two most common modes. Viewing the 
presence (as in adjudication) or the absence (as in negotiation) of a third-party 
decison-maker as the crucial, distinguishing feature, he presented two 
complementary theoretical models of negotiation as a process.82 The role of 
the third party, or "intervenor", was the conceptual focus of Abel’s attempt to 
construct a theory of dispute institutions in society, which proposed a number
78 Nader, "Styles of Court Procedure: To Make the Balance" in Nader (ed.), op.cit. n. 31. 
See also her Harmony Ideology: Justice and Control in a Zapotec Village (1990).
79 Roberts, op.cit. n.9, chapter 9.
80 Danet, "Language in the Legal Process", (1980) 14 Law and Society Review 445 at 493- 
495.
81 Koch, op.cit. n.49, pp. 27-31; see also Koch, "The Anthropology of Law and 
Order", op.cit n.42, pp. 307-311; and Koch, Sodergren and Campbell, op.cit. n.62.
82 Gulliver, op.cit. n.66; see also Gulliver, op.cit. n.50; Gulliver, "Negotiations as a Mode 
of Dispute Settlement: Towards a General Model", (1973) 7 Law and Society Review 




























































































of hypotheses concerning the effects of increasing functional specialisation, 
social differentiation and bureaucratisation on dispute processing.83 The role 
of the third party intervenor was also analysed in detail by sociologists of 
law.84
3. Access to Justice and Informal Alternatives to Courts
Beginning in the mid-1970s, anthropological work on dispute process­
ing was often incorporated into the numerous movements concerned with ac­
cess to justice and informal alternatives to courts. Two factors were especially 
decisive in this trend. The first was the fiscal and legitimation crises of the 
state in western countries, especially the United States, in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. The second was the loss of anthropology's protected status in 
newly independent former colonies and its apparent irrelevance to the de­
mands of emerging states. The former directly affected the amount orienta­
tion of research funds, led to numerous proposals to reform costly, inefficient 
and often inaccessible court systems and stimulated a growing interest in 
grassroots movements and popular justice.85 In conjunction with decreasing 
funds, the latter signalled a decline in opportunities for anthropological re­
search in underdeveloped countries. In a period of widespread criticism of 
traditional anthropological and other social science work,86 it led to calls for
83 Abel, op.cit. n.l 1. Collier, op.cit. n.42, p. 134 notes the absence of systematic studies in 
legal anthropology of the influence on dispute processing of the relationships between 
the third party and the disputants. See now M.P. Baumgartner and D. Black, The 
Theory o f the Third Party (1987).
84 See Black and Baumgartner, op. cit.
85 In the early 1960s, academic lawyers in the United States became especially interested in 
popular tribunals, mainly in Cuba, China, the then Soviet Union and central Europe; see, 
e.g., Lubman "Legal Anthropology and Comparative Social Research on Popular 
Tribunals: The Search for Function", presented at the Conference on "The Relevance of 
Legal Anthropology to Comparative Social Research on Law", Yale Law School 
Program in Law and Modernisation, November 1971. For a critical survey by a sociolo­
gist, see Brady, "Towards a Popular Justice in the United States: The Dialectics of 
Community Action", (1981) 5 Contemporary Crises 155. A recent study is S. Burman 
and W. Scharpf, 'Creating People's Justice: Street Committees and People's Courts in a 
South African City', (1990) 24 Law and Society Review 693.
86 See the writings cited in n.17, and Snyder, op.cit. n.42, pp. 725-734. This does not 




























































































"studying up"87 and for more research on contemporary problems in the 
United States and Europe.88 Particularly in the United States, where most le­
gal anthropologists are employed, anthropological research on dispute pro­
cessing in other countries seemed relevant, though not necessarily directly 
transferable, to domestic concerns. The ethnography of disputing, among 
other elements, suggested the utility of preserving or creating informal alter­
natives to courts and of fostering non-adjudicatory, yet non-political means of 
handling conflict.89 The acceptance of this view, which was encouraged by 
powerful political forces, was facilitated by the largely ahistorical character 
of anthropological work,90 its frequent romanticisation of "tribal" societies,91 
its relative lack of general theory and its neglect of legal form.92
countries: see G.S. Silliman, 'Dispute Processing the the Philippine Agrarian Court’, 
(1981-82) 16 Law and Society Review 89; G.S. Silliman, 'A Political Analysis of the 
Philippines' Katarungang Pambarangay System of Informal Justice through Mediation', 
(1985) 19 Law and Society Review 279.
87 See Nader, "Up the Anthropologist - Perspectives Gained from Studying Up" in Hymes 
(ed.), op.cit. n.17.
88 See Nader and Singer, "Dispute Resolution" in Law in the Future: What are the 
Choices?, Supplement to (1976) 51 California State Bar Journal 281-286 and 311-320; 
Boissevain, "Introduction: Towards a Social Anthropology of Europe" and Katz, 
"Village Responses to National Law: A Case Study from the South Tyrol” in Beyond the 
Community: Social Process in Europe, eds. J. Boissevain and J. Friedl (1975).
89 See, e.g., Cappelletti, "Forward" in Koch (ed.), op.cit. n.42.
90 For discussions of this point, see e.g., Moore, "Archaic Law and Modern Times on the 
Zambezi: Some Thoughts on Max Gluckman's Interpretation of Barotse Law" in 
Gulliver (ed.), op.cit n.30; Swartz, "History and Science in Anthropology" (1958) 21 
Philosophy o f Science 59, reprinted in Manners and Kaplan (eds.), op.cit. n.10; 
Worsley, "The End of Anthropology?" (1970) 3 Transactions o f the Sixth World o f 
Congress o f Sociology 121; I. Meszaros, Marx's Theory o f Alienation (1970), pp.36-48; 
and Thompson, "Anthropology and the Discipline of Historical Context", (1972) 1 
Midland History 41. For a related discussion of anthropological theories of culture, see 
M. Harris, The Rise o f Anthropological Theory: A History o f Theories o f Culture 
(1968).
91 See e.g, Abel, "Delegalization: A Critical Review of its Ideology, Manifestations, and 
Social Consequences" in Blankenburg, Klausa and Rottleuthner (eds.), op.cit. n.71, 
p.29. For a discussion of the romanticisation of liberal democracy in contraposition to 
'tribal society’, see Abel, "The Problem of Values in the Analysis of Political Order: 
Myths of Tribal Society and Liberal Democracy" (A review essay on E. Colson, 
Tradition and Contract: The Problems o f Order (1974), (1978) 16 African Law Studies 
132.
92 See, e.g., Cox and Drever, op.cit. n.42; Abel, op.cit. n.53; and Quinney, "Comment" 
on Lowy, "Modernizing the American Legal System: An Example of the Peaceful Use of 




























































































The origins, composition, ideology and consequences of the movements 
for access to justice and informal alternatives to courts have been extensively 
described and criticised elsewhere.93 In the elaboration of these reforms, 
which were especially ambitious in the United States, anthropologists were 
usually far less important than other, more powerful, more bureaucratically 
oriented professionals such as lawyers and administrators. This was due partly 
to the technical nature of administrative programmes; partly to the different 
concerns of anthropologists, especially in Europe, and their reluctance to con­
duct mainly prospective or evaluative research; and partly to the complex web 
of existing interests at stake in the creation and control of such reforms. 
Instead, the main contributions of anthropologists were to outline different 
forms of dispute processing, provide ethnographic data (usually from other 
countries) and propose limited generalisations.
Among these contributions, one important strand clearly focussed on 
the influences of social organisation on dispute processing, including informal 
alternatives to courts. While most of this work concerned countries outside 
Europe and America, Felstiner’s 1974 paper contrasted forms of dispute pro­
cessing in two ideal types of society. Criticising Danzig's proposal to establish 
urban American community moots patterned on rural Liberian institutions,94 
Felstiner noted the difficulty of finding mediators who shared the same expe­
93 See, e.g. Friedman, "Access to Justice: Social and Historical Context” in Access to 
Justice, Vol. II: Promising Institutions, eds M. Cappelletti and J. Weisner, 1978); Abel, 
"Delegalization ...", op.cit. n. 9; Legality and Its Discontents: A Preliminary Assessment 
of Current Theories of Legalization and Delegalization" in Blankenburg, Klausa and 
Rottleuthner (eds.),op.cit n.71; McGillis, "Neighborhood Justice Centers as Mechanisms 
for Dispute Resolution" in New Directions in Psycholegal Research, eds. P.D. Lippsitt 
and B.D. Sales (1980); McGillis, "The Quiet (R) Evolution in American Dispute 
Settlement", (1980) 31 Harvard Law School Bulletin 20; R.L. Abel(ed.), The Politics of 
Informal Justice: The American Experience (1982) and R.L. Abel (ed.), The Politics o f 
Informal Justice: Comparative Studies (1982). See also A. Sarat, 'The "New Formalism" 
in Disputing and Dispute Processing', (1988) 21 Law and Society Review 695.
94 Danzig, "Toward the Creation of a Complementary, Decentralized System of Criminal 
Justice", (1973) 26 Stanford Law Review 1. Danzig's model was the Kpelle moot de­
scribed in Gibbs, "The Kpelle Moot: A Therapeutic Model for the Informal Settlement of 
Disputes", (1963) 33 Africa 1, reprinted in Bohannan (ed.), op.cit. n.42 and in D. Black 




























































































riences as disputants; he argued that, in any case, the widespread use of avoid­
ance was a much cheaper, easier way of ending disputes in countries such as 
the United States.95 Another influential article was Galanter's discussion of 
why the 'haves' come out ahead. In addition to drawing a distinction between 
regular and sporadic users of courts, it outlined various alternatives to the of­
ficial court system, including inaction or "lumping it", self-help or "exit” 
(avoidance), recourse to private settlement systems and the use of processes 
appended to courts.96
A second strand concentrated on individual perceptions of justice and 
the means of expressing complaints. Reviewing studies by the Berkeley Law 
Project, Nader suggested in 1973 that access to justice was a key concept if one 
took seriously the litigant's perspective. She argued that, in evaluating or as­
cribing a meaning to this notion, one had necessarily to take account of peo­
ple's feelings and perceptions.97 Contrary to the conclusions of some other 
anthropologists,98 she stated that the view that people in all non-Western so­
cieties have access to public forums for resolving grievances "is a romantic 
one, nothing more".99 Subsequently, under the aegis of Ralph Nader's Center
95 Felstiner, "Influences of Social Organisation on Dispute Processing", (1974) 9 Law and 
Society Review 63. See also Danzig and Lowy, "Everyday Disputes and Mediation in 
the United States: A Reply to Professor Felstiner", "Avoidance as Dispute Processing: 
An Elaboration", (1975) 9 Law and Society Review 695. On avoidance, see also 
Greenhouse, "Avoidance as a Strategy for Resolving Conflict in Zinacantan" in Koch 
(ed.), op. cit. n.42.
96 Galanter, "Why The 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change", (1974) 9 Law and Society Review 95. See also Galanter, "Afterward: 
Explaining Litigation", (1975) 9 Law and Society Review 347. This typology was based 
on A. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970).
97 Nader, "Forums for Justice: A Cross-Cultural Perspective", (1975) 31 Journal o f Social 
Issues 151-170 at p. 163.
98 See Koch, "Introduction. Access to Justice: An Anthropological Perspective" in Koch 
(ed.), op.cit. n.42, p.2.
99 Nader, op.cit. n.71, p.92. Among earlier studies on which this conclusion was based 
are Nader and Metzger, "Conflict Resolution in Two Mexican Communities", (1963) 
American Anthropologist 584; Nader, "Choices in Legal Procedure: Shia Moslem and 
Mexican Zapotec", (1965) 67 American Anthropologist 394; and Nader, "Powerlessness 
in Zapotec and U.S. Societies" in Anthropological Studies o f Power, eds. R. Fogelson 




























































































for the Study of Responsive Law,100 she directed a large-scale study of the 
management of complaints among individuals and between individuals and a 
variety of organisations.101
Two major criticisms have been made of the movements for informal 
alternatives and of access to justice. First, it has been argued that access 
involved, in effect, an attempt to de-politicise political struggles by 
transforming them into legal issues.102 Second, it was suggested that informal 
alternatives to courts permit a further, if decentralised, form of state 
control.103 In a review of delegalisation movements, Abel showed that 
delegalisation assumed rough quality between social actors, a high degree of 
normative consensus and the existence of adequate informal controls. He 
concluded that, where these assumptions did not hold, delegalisation tended to 
be detrimental to the already underprivileged and powerless.104
These discussions provided points of reference for many 
anthropologists of law. On the one hand, scholars interested in anthropology 
of law have been involved in the study and evaluation of mediation and other 
alternatives to adjudication.105. Indeed, in the late 1980s and early 1990s the 
study of alternatives to courts has been an important growth area in the
100 Some common interests of Laura and Ralph Nader are indicated in Ralph Nader, 
"Consumerism and Legal Services: The Merging of Movements", (1976) 11 Law and 
Society Review 247.
101 L. Nader (ed.), No Access to Law: Alternatives to the American Judicial System (1980).
102 See Lamb, "Marxism, Access and the State", (1975) 6 Development and Change 119; 
Abel, op.cit. n.65.
103 This point was made in 1973 by Richard Quinney, op.cit. n.91. See also Santos, "Law 
and Community: The Changing Nature of State Power in Late Capitalism", (1980) 8 
International Journal o f the Sociology o f Law 379.
104 Abel, "Delegalization...", op.cit. n.90.
105See, e.g. W.L.F. Felstiner and L.A. Williams, Community Mediation in Dorchester, 
Massachusetts (1980); Witty, op. cit. n. 49; Crowe, 'Complainant Reactions against the 
Massachusetts Commssion against Discrimination (1978) 12 Law and Society Review 
217; and two papers in Cappelletti and Weisner (eds.), op. cit. n. 92: Bierbrauer, Falke 
and Koch, "Conflict and Its Settlement: An Interdisciplinary Study concerning the Legal 
Basis, Function and Performance of the Schiedsmann", and Falke, Bierbrauer and 
Koch, "Legal Advice and the Non-Judicial Settlement of Disputes: A Case Study of the 




























































































subject in Europe.106 On the other hand, especially in the United States, 
anthropologists whose field research concerned dispute processes have often 
drawn on work in other disciplines on ideology and symbolism as a source of 
ideas. They have used their studies of institutional alternatives to courts as a 
basis for theories of legal consciousness and legal ideologies.107
106 See the Bulletin de Liaison of the Laboratoire d'Anthropologie Juridique de Paris. For 
related work by sociologists and academic lawyers, see Z. Bankowski and G. 
Mungham, 'Laypeople and Lawpeople and the Administration of the Lower Courts', 
(1981) 9 International Journal o f the Sociology o f Law 85; S. Roberts , "Mediation in 
Family Disputes', (1983) 46 Modem Law Review 537; J. Effron , 'Alternatives to 
Litigation; Factors in Choosing’, (1989) 52 Modern Law Review 480; A. Ogus et al, 
'Evaluation Alternative Dispute Resolution: Measuring the Impact of Family Conciliation 
on Costs', (1990) 53 Modem Law Review 57; S. Roberts, "Mediation in the Lawyers' 
Embrace", (1992) 55 Modem Law Review 258. See also A. Yakovlev, 'Preferred 
Methods of Dispute Settlement in Two Small Georgian Towns in the U.S.S.R.: a 
Research Note', (1986) 14 International Journal o f the Sociology o f Law 209; M. 
Thornton, 'Equivocations of Conciliation: The Resolution of Discrimination Complaints 
in Australia', (1989) 52 Modern Law Review 733; A. Griffiths, 'The Problem of 
Informal Justice: Family Dispute Processing among the Bakwena - A Case Study', 
(1986) 14 Interntional Journal o f the Sociology o f Law 359; Y. Dezalay, 'From 
Mediation to Pure Law; Practice and Scholarly Representation with in the Legal Sphere’, 
(1986) 14 International Journal o f the Sociology o f Law 89.
107 An influential article was A. Hunt, The Ideology of Law: Advances and Problems in 
Recent Applications of the Concept of Ideology to the Analysis of Law', (1985) 19 Law 
and Society Review 11. See Merry, "Going to Court: Strategies of Dispute Management 
in an American Urban Neighbourhood", (1979) 13 Law Society Review 891; S.E. Merry, 
"Law and Justice among Working Class Americans", (1985) 9 Legal Studies Forum 59; 
S.E. Merry, "Everyday Understandings of the Law in Working-Class America", (1986) 
13 American Ethnologist 253; S.E. Merry, Urban Danger: Life in a Neighborhood o f 
Strangers (1987); S.E. Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness 
among Working-Class Americans (1990); B. Yngvesson, "Legal Ideology and 
Community Justice in the Clerk’s Office", (1985) 9 Legal Studies Forum 71; B. 
Yngvesson, "Making Law at the Doorway: The Clerk, the Court and the Construction of 
Community in a New England Town", (1988) 22 Law and Society Review 409; and the 
following articles in (1988) 22 Law and Society Review, special issue on law and ideol­
ogy edited by the Amherst seminar: B. Messick, "Kissing Hands and Knees: Hegemony 
and Hierarchy in Shari'a Discourse", (1988) 22 Law and Society Review 637; C.B. 
Harrington and S.E. Merry, "Ideological Production: The Making of Community 
Mediation”, (1988) 22 Law and Society Review 709; C.J. Greenhouse, "Courting 
Difference: Issues of Interpretation and Comparison in the Study of Legal Ideologies", 
(1988) 22 Law and Society Review 687. See also F. Snyder, 'Ideologies of Competition 




























































































Some Important Recent Trends
1. General Developments
Until the early 1980s, anthropological studies of legal processes by 
Anglo-American scholars focussed mainly on a set of research questions 
arising from previous work but first articulated clearly in the late 1950's and 
early 1960s. The central concern was to elaborate - in different ways and in a 
changing economic and social context - the ethnographic, theoretical and 
(sometimes) political implications of the premises on which these questions 
were initially based. At the same time, however, anthropological approaches 
to legal processes developed and were modified. The study of disputes, dispute 
settlement and dispute processing has been subject of sharp criticism. 108 p has 
also recently stimulating a rethinking of the meaning of social control. 109 
Correlatively, though without a sharp break from earlier work, several dif­
ferent themes have also emerged.
Painting with a broad brush, it is possible to characterise recent work 
by making six general points. First, today western anthropologists of law are 
more concerned than their predecessors with the study of their own countries. 
Second, there is an increasing, though still relatively small, number of schol­
ars in the field from eastern countries, such as Japan,**0 and from developing 
countries.* I* Third, there is a renewed concern with the state and law (in
198 5 ^  especially R. Kidder, "The End of the Road: Problems in the Analysis of Disputes", 
(1980-81) 15 Law and Society Review 717; M. Cain and K. Kulcsar, "Thinking 
Disputes: An Essay on the Origins of the Dispute Industry", (1981-82) 16 Law and 
Society Review 375.
199 See the important article by M. Strathern, 'Discovering "Social Control'", (1985) 12 
Journal o f Law and Society 111.
119 See in particular M. Chiba (ed.), Asian Indigenous Law - in Interaction with Received 
Law (1986); M. Chiba, Legal Pluralism: Toward a General Theory through Japanese 
Legal Culture (1989).
H I See N. Akbar, 'Africentric Social Sciences for Human Liberation', (1984) 14 Journal of 
Black Studies 395; B. Narokobi, 'Law and Custom in Melanesia', (1989) 14 Pacific 
Perspectives 17; Chief Justice T. Tso, 'The Process of Decision Making in Tribal 
Courts', (1989) 31 Arizona Law Review 225; L. A. Filoiali'i and L. Knowles, 'The 





























































































addition to disputes) as a subject of study.112 Fourth, the study of legal plu­
ralism, including the relation of state law to other normative orders, has come 
close to supplanting dispute processing as the main focus of the field. Fifth, 
reflecting the fact that the small communities which were their traditional 
concerns now often constitute marginalised social groups, anthropologists 
have increasingly sought to place legal processes in their broader national and 
international context. Sixth, even though the strength of this trend should not 
be over-emphasised, there has been to some extent a gradual movement to­
wards the explicit use of macro-sociological theory as a source of research 
questions, working hypotheses and potential explanations.
These changes have usually not led to a basic modification of the scale 
of anthropological research. Anthropologists still tend to concentrate on small 
groups or groupings amenable to study by individual methods, especially par­
ticipant observation. It may be suggested, however, that these developments 
have significantly increased the relevance of anthropologically oriented re­
search to academic lawyers. They have also contributed to the continuing, 
partial convergence of anthropology and sociology. This may be seen by ex­
amining three important recent themes: rules and processes, political economy 
and historical approaches, and legal pluralism.
2. Rules and Processes
At least since Gulliver's Social Control in an African Society,113 
anthropological studies have continually raised questions concerning the role 
of norms in dispute processes. A distinction between norms and power was 
the basis of an early (now rejected) typology of dispute processing.114 This
112 Rosen, 'The Anthropologist as Expert Witness', (1977) 79 American Anthropologist 
555; Rosen, "The Excavation of American Indian Burial Sites: A Problem in Law and 
Professional Responsibility", (1980) 82 American Anthropologist 5.
1 Op.cit. n. 74.
114 Hamnett proposed the concept of executive law to encompass a particular ethnographic 
conjunction of political and judicial elements: see I. Hamnett, Chieftainship and 




























































































distinction may be viewed as a contextually specific version of the general 
issue of freedom versus determinism, which is of course fundamental to the 
social sciences. Though using apparently exotic examples and often couched in 
professional jargon, the anthropological treatment of this issue closely 
resembles discussions in both sociology and law of the relationship between 
freedom and contraint, consent and coercion or substantive and formal 
justice.115 In the 1960s and early 1970s, anthropological work concentrated 
primarily on the processual aspect of disputing, stressing that power was 
central in all forms of dispute processing including adjudication. Recent 
studies of rules and processes, however, have examined and thus re­
emphasised the importance of norms, whether in triadic processes (e.g., 
adjudication) or in dyadic ones (e.g., negotiation). In doing so, they have 
shown that norms do not automatically determine the outcome of a dispute 
and in fact serve a number of different functions in dispute processes and 
other social relations.
Legal anthropology has treated the role of norms in several different 
ways. Two related perspectives represent logical developments of earlier 
research. One concerns the relationships among concepts, rules and actual 
behaviour and emphasises the processual nature of all systems of rules. Thus, 
Moore has analysed the ways in which general concepts are adjusted to 
specific social circumstances, arguing that legal systems are, necessarily, 
partially indeterminant orders: the same social processes, such as competition, 
that prevent total regulation of social life by rules also shape and transform 
attempts at partial regulation.116 A second perspective, elaborated especially
115 See, e.g. Dawe, "Theories of Social Action" and Fisher and Strauss, "Interactionism" in 
A History o f Sociological Analysis, eds. T. Bottomore and R. Nisbet, (1978); Hunt, 
"Dichotomy and Contradiction in the Sociology of Law", (1981) 8 British Journal o f Law 
and Society 47; Abel, "Delegalization...", op.cit. n.90. See also A. Giddens, Central 
Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis 
(1979).
116 See, e.g., Moore. "Descent and Legal Position" in Nader (ed.), op.cit. n.30; Moore. 
"Epilogue: Uncertainties in Situations, Indeterminacies in Culture" in Symbol and 




























































































by Gulliver in work on negotiation, is the conception that norms themselves 
are a form of power, manipulated and used selectively by parties (and third 
parties) in disputes.117 Other writers treated norms as cultural codes, 
sometimes drawing on Bernstein's work to elucidate the role of brokers in 
mediating relationships,118 and sometimes emphasising the ways in which 
people use norms in re-negotiating the bases of inter-personal and wider 
social order.1 Another strand concentrated on the use of norms in 
argument. Thus, Comaroff and Roberts argue that, in Tswana dispute 
processes, "express invocation of norms...is associated with efforts to assert 
control over the paradigm of argument"; they advocated greater attention to 
factors intrinsic to the process of argument as distinct from extrinsic factors 
such as political organisation or institutional structure.12(1
These concerns formed part of the increased emphasis in legal (and
general) anthropology on the ways in which people conceive, create and
sustain definitions of situations, especially through the use of language. While
previous anthropological work stressed the phases of disputes and the
transformation of social relations and of the issues at stake as a dispute moved
from a private context to the public arena, this research paid special attention
to the role of language in these processes of situational transformation.121
Moore, "Introduction" in S.F. Moore, Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach 
(1978), which includes several of her most important papers; see also my review of Law 
as Process in (1979) 6 British Journal o f Law and Society 135.
117 See especially Gulliver, op.cit. n.66, pp. 190-194; see also Roberts, op.cit. n.9, p.182.
118 Perry, "Law Codes and Brokerage in a Lesotho Village" in Hamnett (ed.), op.cit. supra 
n.42.
1111 See, e.g., Roberts, "The Kgatla Marriage: Concepts of Validity" in Roberts (ed.), op.cit. 
n.7; Comaroff and Roberts, "Marriage and Extra-marital Sexuality: The Dialectics of 
Legal Change among the Kgatla", (1977) 21 Journal o f African Law 97; and Werbner, 
"Land, Movement and Status among Kalanga of Botswana" in Studies in African Social 
Anthropology, eds. M. Fortes and S. Patterson (1975).
1211 Comaroff and Roberts, "The Invocation of Norms in Dispute Settlement: The Tswana 
Case" in Hamnett (ed.), op.cit. n.42; the quotation is from p. 106. See also J. Comaroff 
and S. Roberts, Rules and Processes: The Cultural Logic o f Disputes in an African 
Context (1981).
121 See Gulliver, op.cit. n.66, p.20 and sources cited there. For recent work, see, e.g., 
Mather and Yngvesson, "Language, Audience and the Transformation of Disputes", 
(1980-81) 15 Law and Society Review 775; Arno, "A Grammer of Conflict: Informal 




























































































Some writers have also analysed the role of language in disputing within the 
context of wider social relations. Thus, LeRoy discusses legal reasoning by 
members of rural councils in dispute processes in Senegal.122 Santos analyses 
the use of legal reasoning, argumentative discourse and rhetoric in the 
construction and reproduction of legality in a Brazilian squatter settlement.123 
Seeking to transcend the dichotomy between rule-centred and processual 
approaches, Comaroff and Roberts emphasise the dialectical relationship 
between the sociocultural system and individual action. They show how, in 
Tswana chiefdoms, the former constitutes a set of normative terms within 
which disputing occurs and has meaning, while, in turn, disputing and other 
social processes affect and potentially transform the sociocultural 
framework.124
While giving more attention to the role of norms in disputing and other 
social processes, some anthropologists have suggested that the treatment of 
norms as a code draws basically into question jural models of social relation­
ships.125 This assertion has two related aspects that should be distinguished.
Communication and Control of Communication: An Interactionist Perspective on Legal 
and Customary Procedures for Conflict Management", (1985) 87 A m erican  
Anthropologist 40; and the papers in M. Bloch (ed.), Political Language and Oratory in 
Traditional Society (1975). This emphasis on language and transformation differs from 
earlier studies of the use of language, either those that merely describe linguistic ex­
pressions of cultural concepts or those that aim at more formal ethnosemantic analyses of 
terms and expressions. See, e.g., P.J. Bohannan, Justice and Judgement among the Tiv 
(1957, reprinted with a new Preface in 1968); S.A. Schlegel, Tiruray Justice: Traditional 
Tiruray Law and Morality (1970); Verdier, "Ontology of the Judicial Thought of the 
Kabré of Northern Togo" in Nader (ed.), op.cit. n.31; Black and Metzger, 
"Ethnographic Description and the Study of Law" in Nader (ed.), op.cit. n.13, reprinted 
in Cognitive Anthropology, ed. S.A. Tyler, 1969); and Frake, "Struck by Speech: The 
Yakan Concept of Litigation" in Nader (ed.), op.cit. n.31. For a review of some studies 
of the use of language in dispute processes Danet, op.cit. n.79, pp.490-546.
122 See LeRoy, "L'expérience juridique autochtone et le transfert des connaissances ju- 
risiques occidentales en Afrique noire" in Domination ou Partage? (UNESCO, 1980), 
and 'Legal Paradigm and Legal Discourse: The Case of the Laws of French-speaking 
Black Africa', (1984) 12 International Journal o f the Sociology o f Law 1.
123 Santos, "The Law of the Oppressed: The Construction and Reproduction of Legality in 
Pasargada", (1977) 12 Law and Society Review 5; the quotation is from p.92.
124 See Comaroff and Roberts, op.cit. n. 27.
125 See especially Comaroff, "Introduction" and "Bridewealth and the Control of Ambiguity 
in a Tswana Chiefdom" in The Meaning o f Marriage Payments (ed. J.L. Comaroff, 
1980). See also the debate concerning the Nuer leopard-skin chief in: Gruel. "The 




























































































First, western theories of law are limited or inadequate in analysing 
dispute processes and the forms of social order or domination elsewhere. This 
argument usually rests either on cultural grounds, hence refers generally to 
all non-western 'societies',126 or on economic/historical grounds, hence refers 
specifically to precapitalist social formations.122 Many, if not most, contem­
porary legal anthropologists would accept at least one of the two quite differ­
ent versions of this general point. The other aspect is the rejection of anthro­
pological or other approaches that view relatively unambigous rules as the 
basic constitutive elements in social relationships.1211 This includes both legal 
rules, whether derived from western jurisprudence or not, and non-legal 
rules, such as those generally given analytic priority in normative approaches 
in social science. This second position does not negate a discussion of norms, 
to the extent that they form part of the repertoire used by individuals in social 
interaction. It simply views the world primarily as a negotiated order, in 
which the relationship between rules and processes is always inherently prob­
lematic. Taken to its logical conclusion, this view implies a type of anthropo­
logical analysis that gives primary, if not exclusive emphasis to the ways in 
which individuals construct and manage social relations, including not only 
relationships among individuals but also those underlying broader social pro­
cesses. These anthropological approaches to legal processes bear a close affin­
ity to the interactionist and phenomenological schools in sociology. They dif­
fer, in some cases very sharply, from approaches such as historical material­
ism, which are often concerned with individual actions and conceptions but
American Anthropologist 1115; Haight, ''A Note on the Leopard-Skin Chief', (1972) 74 
American Anthropologist 1313; and Evens, "Leopard Skins and Paper Tigers: 'Choice' 
and 'Social Structure' in The Nuer", (1978) N.S. 13 Man 100.
126 See, e.g, Roberts, op.cit. n.9.
122 See, e.g., F.G. Snyder, Capitalism and Legal Change: An African Transformation 
(1981).
128 See, e.g., Comaroff, op.cit. n. 124; Comaroff and Roberts, op.cit. n.27; and Comaroff, 




























































































emphasise the great extent to which these are shaped, limited or determined 
by fundamental, supra-individual economic laws or forces.
4. Political Economy and Historical Approaches
Since the mid-1970s, anthropologists have placed greater emphasis on 
economic factors, social inequality and forms of domination.129 Especially in 
research on brokerage, pluralism and legal change, they have also recognised 
that the village is generally not an appropriate unit of study; Murray, for ex­
ample, points out that "piece-meal ethnography can only make sense within its 
full political, economic and social context".130 These features have often 
characterised both the work of anthropologists interested in the political econ­
omy of law as well as that of anthropologists using a non-materialist historical 
approach.131
Work on the political economy of law was stimulated by the general 
elaboration of marxist theory since the mid-1960s. It drew particularly on the 
attempts to elaborate and utilise marxism in French economic anthropology, 
British writing on precapitalist modes of production, peasant studies, and de-
129 See, for example, the re-evaluation of aspects of Gluckman's work in Moore.op.cit. 
supra n.89, and Frankenberg, "Economic Anthropology or Political Economy? (I): The 
Barotse Social Formation - A Case Study" in The New Economic Anthropology, ed. J. 
Clammer (1978). See also Starr and Yngvesson, "Scarcity and Disputing: Zeroing-in on 
Compromise Decisions", (1975) 2 American Ethnologist 533; Collier, "Stratification and 
Dispute Handling in Two Highland Chiapas Communities", (1979) 6 American  
Ethnologist 305; Dwyer, "Bridging the Gap between the Sexes in Moroccan Legal 
Practice" in Sexual Stratification, ed. A. Schleger 1977); Dwyer, "Law Actual and 
Perceived: The Sexual Politics of Law in Morocco", (1979) 13 Law and Society Review 
739.
13°  Murray, "High Bridewealth, Migrant Labour and the Position of Women in Lesotho", 
(1977) 21 Journal o f African Law 79 at p.79. See also Snyder, "French Colonial Policy, 
Law, and Diola-Bandial Society, 1815- 1915: Background to Legal Change in Rural 
Senegal", (1973) 22 Rural Africana 69; Snyder, "Land Law and Economic Change in 
Rural Senegal: Diola Pledge Transactions and Disputes" in Hamnett (ed.), op.cit. n. 42; 
and Abel, "The Rise of Capitalism and the Transformation of Disputing: From 
Confrontation over Honor to Competition for Property" (review article on Starr, Dispute 
and Settlement in Rural Turkey: An Ethnography o f Law (1978), (1979) UCLA Law 
Review  223; D.H. Levine, "Harmony, Law and Anthropology" (review article on 
Nader, Harmony Ideology: Justice and Control in a Zapotec Mountain Village (1990), 
(1991) 89 Michigan Law Review 1766.
131 On some differences between these two strands, see S.E. Merry, "Review Essay: Law 




























































































pendency and underdevelopment theory.132 Legal anthropological research 
drawing on political economy has been concerned to explore the implications, 
insights and limitations of different marxist theories and concepts for the 
study of legal processes. In contrast to other work, it tends to be more inter­
ested in general theory and to emphasise the economic bases of political and 
legal institutions, the relationship of law to class formation, and the connec­
tions between changes in legal processes and the development of capitalism as 
a distinct historical form.
A continuing theme is the relationship between the development of 
capitalism and processes of legal change. Using the notion of mode of 
production as an historical/economic category,133 Snyder discusses the ways 
in which the subsumption of African peasants within capitalist relations of 
production influenced legal ideas within a formerly precapitalist social 
formation. He argues that the apparent continuity of legal concepts hides a 
profound transformation of both economy and law.134 Employing the idea of 
the articulation of modes of production133, Fitzpatrick argues that in
132 A survey of this literature may be found in Snyder op.cit. n.42. See also Fitzpatrick, 
"Law, Modernization, and Mystification" and Greenberg "Law and Development in 
Light of Dependency Theory" in 3 Research in Law and Sociology, ed. S. Spitzer 
(1980). An earlier study is Diamond, "The Rule of Law versus the Order of Custom" in 
The Rule o f Law, ed. R.P. Wolff (1971). On marxist theory in anthropology generally, 
see Copans, "In Search of Lost Theory: Marxism and Structuralism within French 
Anthropology", (1979) 3 Review  45-73; and Kahn and Llobera, "French Marxist 
Anthropology: Twenty Years After" (review article on D. Seddon, ed., Relations o f  
Production: Marxist Approaches to Economic Anthropology (1978), (1980) 8 Journal o f 
Peasant Studies 81.
133 Banaji, "Modes of Production in a Materialist Conception of History", (1977) 3 Capital 
and Class 1. See also Bernstein, "Notes on Capital and Peasantry", (1977) 10 Review o f 
African Political Economy 60 and Bernstein, "Concepts for the Analysis of 
Contemporary Peasantries", (1979) 6 Journal of Peasant Studies 421.
13^ See Snyder, op.cit. n.126; Snyder, "Labour Power and Legal Transformation in 
Senegal", (1981) 21 Review of African Political Economy 26; Snyder, "Colonialism and 
Legal Form: The Creation of 'Customary Law’ in Senegal", in C. Sumner (ed.). Crime, 
Justice and Underdevelopment (1982), longer version in (1981) 21 Journal o f Legal 
Pluralism  26; and Snyder, 'Folk Law' and Historical Transitions: Conceptual and 
Theoretical Issues" in A.N. Alllott and G.R. Woodman (eds.). People's Law and State 
Law: The Bellagio Papers (1985).
133 These theories are reviewed in Foster-Carter, "The Modes of Production Controversy",
(1978) 107 New Left Review 47; see also J.G. Taylor, From Modernization to Modes o f 





























































































contemporary underdeveloped countries, one of the functions of law is to 
conserve the traditional mode of production despite economic forces tending 
towards its dissolution. 136 He emphasises the ways in which state law is used 
to restrict the formation of indigenous classes and seeks to show how 
precapitalist law constitutes, and is constituted by, precapitalist modes of
production. 137
These analyses necessarily give special attention to the role of the state; and 
anthropological approaches have especially emphasised the connections be­
tween the state and legal processes in rural and urban communities. Both 
Fitzpatrick and Paliwala have demonstrated that, despite official pronounce­
ments, the establishment of village courts in Papua New Guinea effectively 
extended the state apparatus of social control into rural villages and enhanced 
the formation of class alliances. 138 Fitzpatrick and Blaxter jointly examine the 
effects of licensing laws on small-scale entrepreneurs and class formation. 139 
Discussing Senegalese rural administrative reforms, Le Roy argues that an 
original form of law, which he calls local law, emerged in certain African 
countries as a new form of state penetration into rural communities. I40 136789
136 See Fitzpatrick, Law and State in Papua New Guinea (1980); Fitzpatrick, op.cit. supra 
n.169; Fitzpatrick, "The Political Economy of Dispute Settlement in Papua New Guinea" 
in Sumner (ed.), op.cit. n.133.
137 See Fitzpatrick, "’Really Rather Like Slavery': Law and Labour in the Colonial 
Economy of Papua New Guinea" in 3 Essays in the Political Economy o f Australian 
Capitalism, eds. E.L. Wheelwright and K. Buckley (1978); Fitzpatrick, "The Creation 
and Containment of the Papua New Guinea Peasantry" in 4 Essays in the Political 
Economy o f Australian Capitalism, eds. E.L. Wheelwright and K. Buckley (1980); and 
Fitzpatrick, "Transformations of Law and Labour in Papua New Guinea", in Labour, 
Law and Crime: A Historical Perspective, eds. F. Snyder and D. Hay (1987).
138 See Fitzpatrick, "The Political Economy of Dispute Settlement in Papua New Guinea" 
and Paliwala, "The Law and Order in the Village: Papua New Guinea's Village Courts" 
in Sumner (ed.), op.cit. n.133. See D. Weisbrot, A. Paliwala and A. Sawyerr (eds.). 
Law and Social Change in Papua New Guinea (1983).
139 Fitzpatrick and Blaxter, "Imposed Law in the Containment of Papua New Guinea 
Economic Ventures" in The Imposition o f Law, op.cit. n.32.
l4(l See Le Roy, "L’émergence d'un droit foncier local au Sénégal" in Dynamiques et finali­
tés des droits africains, ed. G. Conac (1980); Le Roy, "Le juge d'instance, le sous- 
préfet et les paysans: Les détournements de la fonction judiciare dans le règlement de 
conflits fonciers au Sénégal, presented to the Séminaire interdisciplinaire d'études ju­
ridiques, Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis, Brussels; Le Roy, "Local Law in Black 




























































































Though sharing with other scholars an interest in legal pluralism, these 
writers have been especially concerned with the implications of legal 
pluralism for class formation and the possibility of political action by 
dominated groups and classes.141 A symposium on African land systems, in 
which several legal anthropologists participated, discussed the relationships 
between small-scale legal processes and independent political action.142 The 
same issues have also been considered by Santos.142 Many themes in this work 
show the close similarity of concerns between approaches borrowing from 
neo-marxist theories in legal anthropology and in sociology of law.144
Since the mid-1980s a number of anthropologists have adopted
historical approaches to the study of legal processes. This work has sometimes
involved co-operation with scholars from other disciplines, particularly social
historians.145 It is based on the view that law and dispute processes need to be
understood in the context of long-term social change. This view is shared with
those interested in the political economy of law, but this more recent work
Some Other Countries", in A. Allott and G.R. Woodman (eds.). People's Law and State 
Law: The Bellagio Papers (1985).
141 See also Snyder, "Legal Innovation and Social Change in a Peasant Community: A 
Senegalese Village Police", (1978) 48 Africa 231; and Snyder, "Droit non-étatique et lég­
islation nationale au Sénégal”, in Conac (ed.), op.cit. supra n.139.
142 See J.P. Chauveau, J.P. Dozon, E. LeBris, E. LeRoy, G. Salem and F.G. Snyder, 
"Rapport introducif" in Problèmes fonciers en Afrique Noire: Rapport introducif aux 
Journées d'études sur les problèmes fonciers en Afrique Noire (Paris, September 1980). 
This meeting was the first in a series leading to the establishment of the Association pour 
la promotion des recherches et etudes foncières en Afrique, which, under the aegis of the 
Laboratoire d'Anthropologie Juridique de Paris, has published several important studies 
of African land questions: see E. Le Bris, E. Le Roy and F. Leimdorfer (eds), Enjeux 
fonciers en Afrique noire (1983); B. Crousse, E. Le Bris and E. Le Roy (eds). Espaces 
disputés en Afrique noire (1986); and E. Le Bris, E. Le Roy and P. Mathieu (eds), 
L'appropriation de la terre en Afrique noire: Manuel d'analyse, de décision et de gestion 
foncière (1991).
142 See Santos, op.cit. n. 122; Santos, "Popular Justice, Dual Power and Socialist Strategy" 
in Capitalism and the Rule o f Law: From Deviancy Theory to Marxism, eds. B. Fine, R. 
Kinsey, J. Lea, S.Picciotto and J. Young (1979); Santos, "Law and Revolution in 
Portugal: The Experiences of Popular Justice after the 25th April 1974", presented at the 
4th Conference of the European Group for the Study of Deviance and Social Control, 
Vienna, September 1976; and Santos, op.cit. n. 112.
144 See also P. Fitzpatrick, 'Is it simple to be a Marxist in Legal Anthropology', (1985) 48 
Modern Law Review A ll.
145 See F. Snyder and D. Hay (eds), Labour, Law and Crime: An Historical Perspective 
(1987); D. Hay and F. Snyder (eds), Policing and Prosecution in Britain, 1750-1850 




























































































gives less attention perhaps to economic relations and more to cultural 
concepts, symbols and political strategies146. For example, Chanock has 
analysed the creation of customary law in Malawi and Zambia.147 Moore 
traces the change and development of "customary law" among the Chagga 
between 1880 and 1980.148 More recently, Starr has aimed to analyse 
competition between secular and Islamic elites over law and legal structures 
and control of the state in Turkey.149 This work, like that deriving from the 
political economy, illustrates the borrowing from neighbouring subdisciplines 
and the fluidity of disciplinary boundaries which is increasingly characteristic 
of the anthropology of law.
3. Legal Pluralism
The view that any society or social group contains a plurality of legal 
orders or fragments of legal systems is well-known in jurisprudence and 
sociology of law.150 It was re-asserted by Llewellyn and Hoebel in The 
Cheyenne Way151 and has increasingly been elaborated by legal 
anthropologists.152 As Griffiths has shown,153 legal pluralism starts from the 
rejection of the notion of legal centralism - that law necessarily is the law of
146 See the introduction and other essays in J. Starr and J.F. Collier (eds.), History and 
Power in the Study o f Law (1989); see also J. Starr and J.F. Collier, 'Historical Studies 
of Legal Change,' (1987) 38 Current Anthropology 367.
147 M. Chanock, Law, Custom and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and 
Zambia (1985); see also by review article by Snyder, 'Rethinking African Customary 
Law', (1988) 51 Modem Law Review 252. On the creation of customary law, see also 
Snyder, "Colonialism and Legal Form”, op. cit. n. 133.
148 S.F. Moore, Social Facts and Fabrications: "Customary Law" on Kilimanjaro, 1880- 
1980 (1986).
149 J. Starr, Law as Metaphor: From Islamic Courts to the Palace o f Justice (1992).
!50 See the discussion of von Gierke, Ehrlich and Weber in Pospisil, The Anthropology o f 
Law..., op.cit. n.32, pp.102-104. See also N. Rouland, Anthropologie juridique 
(1988), passim.
151 Op.cit. n.22, especially pp.28, 53.
152 For a survey of the literature from 1978 to 1988, see S.E. Merry, 'Legal Pluralism', 
(1988) 22 Law and Society Review 132; and F. von Benda-Beckmann, "Comment on 
Merry", (1988) 22 Law and Society Review 897. In view of these recent reviews, an 
extended discussion of this literature is not necessary here.




























































































the state, is uniform and exclusive and is administered by state institutions. 
Since Furnivall's early work,154 three writers have proposed different 
conceptions of legal pluralism: Pospisil elaborated the idea of a multiplicity of 
legal systems and the existence of legal levels in a single society;155 Smith 
proposed a structural conception of pluralism based on corporate groups;156 
and Moore has advanced a conception of semi-autonomous social fields based 
on processual characteristics.157 *The last conception has been widely adopted, 
and it provides a basis for what currently is probably the most dynamic part 
of contemporary legal anthropology.1511 Griffiths has elaborated a descriptive 
theory of legal pluralism within a positivist sociological framework, while 
Fitzpatrick used Moore's notion of semi-autonomous social fields to develop a 
m aterialist/structuralist conception of pluralism in underdeveloped 
countries.159 Less explicitly theoretical research has taken several directions. 
Roberts distinguishes between two lines of research, one concentrating on the 
litigant's perspective, especially the choice between one among several 
potential dispute-handling institutions; and the other focussing on dispute 
agencies themselves, including both institutional characteristics and the
154 J.S. Fumivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study o f Burma and 
Netherlands India (1948).
155 Op.cit. n.23.
156 See "Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralism" in Pluralism in Africa (ed. L. 
Kuper and M.G. Smith, 1969), reprinted in M.G. Smith, Corporations and Society 
(1974); and "The Sociological Framework of Law" in African Law: Adaptation and 
D evelopm ent (eds. H. Kuper and L. Kuper, 1965). For discussion, see Moore, 
"Introduction" in S.F. Moore, Law as Process, op.cit supra n.131. For criticism of the 
concept of pluralism, see Legassick, "The Concept of Pluralism: A Critique" in African 
Social Studies: A Radical Reader (eds. P.C.W. Gutkind and P. Waterman, 1977).
157 See Moore, "Law and Social Change: The Semi-autonomous Social Field as an 
Appropriate Subject of Study", (1973) 7 Law and Society Review 719, reprinted in 
Moore, Law as Process, op.cit. n. 115, chapter 2. See also Moore, "Individual Interests 
and Organisational Structures: Dispute Settlements as 'Events of Articulation'" in 
Hamnett (ed.), op.cit. n.35.
1511 Santos has argued that legal pluralism is the key concept in a postmodern view of law: 
B. de Sousa Santos, 'Law: A Map of Misreading; Toward a Postmodern Conception of 
Law', (1987) 14 Journal o f Law and Society 279.
159 See Griffiths, op.cit. n. 152; Fitzpatrick, "Law, Plurality and Underdevelopment" in 




























































































behaviour of third parties. *60 Members of the Berkeley Law Project were 
concerned with both strands, as has Keebet von Benda-Beckmann in research 
on Indonesia.161 Van Rouveroy has considered similar questions in the 
Togolese context;162 the Stratherns and others have examined the 
relationships between state and non-state institutions elsewhere.163 In addition 
to emphasising competition between dispute institutions for cases and other 
resources, anthropologists have stressed the ways in which brokers mediate 
between rural communities and state agencies. They have shown that the role 
of brokers is crucial in maintaining or transforming hierarchies of institutions 
and processes.164
The work on legal pluralism reflects an early debate in legal 
anthropology that was couched in terms of a discussion of the methodology of 
description and analysis but in fact concerned the general purposes of 
research.165 Mirroring different analytical traditions also, Anglo-American 
anthropologists have tended to focus on institutional pluralism, while French
1611 Roberts, "Introduction" in Roberts (ed.), op.cit. n.6, p.8.
161 On the former, see Nader and Todd (eds.), op.cit. n.42; E. Hunt and R. Hunt, 'The 
Role of Courts in Rural Mexico' in Peasants in the Modern World, ed. P.K. Bock 
(1969). On the latter, see especially K. von Benda-Beckmann, The Broken Stairways to 
Consensus: Village Justice and State Courts in Minangkabau (1984). See also K. von 
Benda-Beckmann and F. Strijbosch (eds.), Anthropology o f Law in the Netherlands 
(1986).
162 E.A.B. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, A la recherche de la Justice: Quelques aspects du 
droit matrimonial et de la justice de Paix et du Chef Supérieur des Anufom àMango dans 
le Nord du Togo (1976); "Unité du droit ou diversité du droit: Bases juridiques du droit 
coutumier au Togo", (1979) 12 Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee 143; "Chieftaincy in 
Northern Togo”, (1980) 13 Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee 115.
163 See, e.g., M. Strathern, Official and Unofficial Courts: Legal Assumptions and 
Expectations in a Highlands Community (1972); A Strathern, "When Dispute Procedures 
Fail" in Epstein (ed.), op.cit n.42; Lahav, "The Division of Legal Labor in Rural Haiti”, 
(1975) 8 Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee 465-481; Roberts, "Tradition and Change at 
Mochudi: Competing Jurisdictions in Botswana", (1979) 17 African Law Studies 37-51.
164 Collier, op.cit. n.57; Freeman, op.cit. n.57; Werbner, "Small-Man Politics and the Rule 
of Law: Centre-Periphery Relations in East-Central Botswana", (1977) 21 Journal o f 
African Law 24-39.
165 A summary of and references concerning this debate are given in Moore, "Comparative 
Studies: Introduction”, Gluckman, "Concepts in the Comparative Study of Tribal Law", 





























































































research has frequently concentrated mainly on concepts166. Many writers 
have emphasised the continued survival of dispute-processing institutions 
relatively independent of the state.167 Others have discussed the frequently 
profound disparity between the concepts embodied in state law and those held 
in many cases by the majority of a country's population.168 More recently, 
drawing on Foucault Fitzpatrick has elaborated the concept of 'integral 
plurality': state law is constituted in relation to a plurality of social forms 
which both support and oppose it.169
The study of legal pluralism is perhaps the major area of contemporary 
research.170 It has been encouraged in particular by the Commission on Folk 
Law and Legal Pluralism by its newsletter and regular international confer-
166 See LeRoy, op.cit. n.2; Le Roy, op.cit. n.41; Sacralité, Pouvoir et Droit en Afrique 
(1979). See also (1990) Journal o f Legal Pluralism, special issue on "L'anthropologie 
juridique francophone", eds. F. Snyder and E. Le Roy; N. Rouland, Anthropologie ju ­
ridique (1989); N. Rouland, L'anthropologie juridique (1990); N. Rouland, Les rivages 
du droit: Anthropologie juridique de la modernité (1992). For different approaches to 
concepts and cultural precepts, see L. Rosen, including "Equity and Discretion in a 
Modem Islamic Legal System", (1980-81) 15 Law and Society Review 217; L. Rosen, 
Bargaining for Reality: The Construction o f Social Relations in a Muslim Community 
(1984); L. Rosen, The Anthropology o f Justice: Law as Culture in Islamic Society 
(1989); L. Rosen, "Islamic 'Case Law' and the Logic of Consequence", in Starr and 
Collier (eds.), op. cit. n. 42; F. von Benda-Beckmann, Property in Social Continuity: 
Continuity and Change in the Maintenance o f Property Relationships through in Time in 
Minangkabau, West Sumatra (1979); F. von Benda-Beckmann, "Anthropology and 
Comparative Law", in K. von Benda-Beckmann and F. Strijbosch (eds.), op. cit. n. 
160; and Schott, "Le droit contre la loi: Conceptions traditionnelles et jurisdiction actuelle 
chez les Bulsa au Ghana du Nord" in Conac (ed.), op. cit. n. 139.
167 See, e.g., Roberts, "The Survival of the Traditional Tswana Courts in the National Legal 
System of Botswana", (1972) 16 Journal o f African Law 103.
!68 See Niang, "Place du droit islamique dans la vie juridique sénégalaise contemporaine: 
Confrontation des modèles (autochtone, occidental et musulman)", presented at the 
Second Meeting of the Africanist Network, UNESCO Project on the Transfer of Legal 
Knowledge, Malta, November 1980; and the papers in (1975) 1 Kroniek van Afrika [now 
African Perspectives] on "The Disparity between Law and Social Reality in Africa" (eds. 
B.E. Harrell-Bond and E.A.B. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal). See also the review by 
Snyder in (1976) 1 African Law Studies 162.
169 See, e.g., P. Fitzpatrick, 'Law, Plurality and Underdevelopment', in Legality, Ideology 
and the State, ed. D. Sugarman (1983); 'Marxism and Legal Pluralism', (1983) 1 
Australian Journal o f Law and Society 45; 'Law and Societies', (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal 115; "The desperate vacuum': imperialism and law in the experience of the 
Enlightenment", (1989) 13 Droit et Société 347.
170See also R Gadacz, 'Folk Law and Legal Pluralism: Issues and Directions in the 




























































































ences.171 Not only has the Commission had a practical impact, particularly in 
Canada and Australia,172 but it has also promoted a rethinking of what have 
often been considered to be universal legal concepts, such as human rights.173 
This approach to the study of disputes, law and social order has yet to reach 
its full potential: it is likely to be stimulated by current trends towards re­
gionalism, decentralisation and local community power. Indeed, the study of 
legal pluralism, together with other anthropological approaches, are in some 
cases only now beginning to be applied to some central fields of academic le­
gal studies, such as European Community law.174
Conclusion
This review aimed to introduce some of the major themes in 
anthropological approaches to law since the early 1960s. Special attention has
171 See H. Finkler (compiler), Papers o f the Symposia on Folk Law and Legal Pluralism, 
XIth International Congress o f Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, Vancouver, 
Canada, 19-23 August 1983, 2 vols; A. Allott and G.R. Woodman (eds.), People's Law 
and State Law: The Bellagio Papers (1985); B. Morse and G. Woodman (eds.), 
Indigenous Law and the State (1988); F. von Benda-Beckmann, K. von Benda- 
Beckmann, E. Casino, F. HIrtz, G.R. Woodman and H.F. Zacher (eds.), Between 
Kinship and the State: Social Security and the Law in Developing Countries (1988); 
Harald Finkler (compiler), Proceedings o f the Vlth International Symposium on Folk 
Law and Legal Pluralism, Ottawa, Canada, 14-18 August 1990, 2 vols. See also K. von 
Benda-Beckmann and F. Strijbosch (eds.), Anthropology o f Law in the Netherlands: 
Essays in Legal Pluralism (1986).
172 See R. Kuppe, M. Wiber and A. Griffiths (eds.), Group Rights: Strategies fo r Assisting 
the Fourth World, in (1990) 5 Law and Anthropology: Internationales Jahrbuch fiir 
Rechtsantropologie (Special Issue).
173 See R. Pannikar, ’Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?', (1982) 120 
Diogenes 75; A.D. Renteln, The Concept of Human Rights', (1988) 83 Anthropos 343; 
E. Le Roy, 'Les fondements anthropologiques des droits de l'homme: crise de l'univer­
salisme et post-modernité', (1992) 17 Revue de la Recherche Juridique: Droit Prospectif 
139.
174 See F. Snyder, New Directions in European Community Law (1990); F. Snyder, The 
Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and 
Techniques', (1993) 56 Modern Law Review 19. See also F. Snyder (ed.), European 




























































































been given to tracing developments over the whole period, rather than 
concentrating solely on recent research. The paper has dealt mainly with the 
literature available in English, though some significant research in France and 
other countries has also been noted. Within these limitations, the discussion 
sought to outline the major recent developments and the principal, if 
sometimes incipient, theoretical strands. The review also indicated the 
existence of many potentially overlapping interests between proponents of 
anthropological approaches and either academic lawyers or sociologists of 
law, though obviously any effective collaboration between people in these 
groups depends ultimately on factors such as the recognition of common 
objectives. This conclusion suggests several of the contributions and 
limitations of anthropological approaches in relation to the study of law and 
legal processes.
If a review of the literature in a field is to go beyond simply 
recognising the merits and demerits of specific studies or theoretical positions, 
it should involve identifying the specific features which distinguish it from its 
disciplinary neighbours. In the case of anthropological approaches to law, 
however, this is a difficult if not impossible task. The historical legacy of the 
initial concern of anthropology (in contrast to sociology) with non-western 
social groups is still important. But if one takes a broad view of 
anthropological approaches to law and dispute processes, it may be suggested 
that little, if anything, distinguishes this work from the similar and equally 
diverse theoretical strands in sociology.175 Except for the fact that many of 
their authors have achieved a PhD in anthropology, virtually all of the studies 
discussed in this paper could be classified within sociology. The separation 
between anthropology and sociology is perhaps a useful institutional myth, but
175 This and related points are discussed in Hymes. "The Use of Anthropology: Critical, 
Political, Personal" in Hymes (ed.), op.cit. n.16. Compare the statement by Kuper, 
op.cit. n.6, p. 238, that "Whichever theoretical model is used, the distinctive anthropo­
logical perspective...is to begin by assuming that the actors' models are part of the data, 




























































































in intellectual terms it is often arbitrary. It hinders rather than helps 
collaboration between anthropologists and academic lawyers.
While accepting this point, it is possible to identify some common 
features of the studies discussed, which for the present purposes may be taken 
to exemplify contemporary anthropological approaches to the study of law 
and related matters. Though shared with much sociological research, these 
features distinguish this work from many academic legal studies.176 
Consequently, they may indicate some ways in which anthropological 
approaches can contribute to academic studies of law.
It is useful initially to amplify the suggestion made by previous writers 
that the special contributions of anthropology to academic legal studies lie, 
first, in research methods and, secondly, in an emphasis on certain aspects of 
our legal system that academic lawyers sometimes overlook. From the 
methodological standpoint, anthropological approaches often emphasise 
micro-analysis and use an extended-case method. Especially when combined 
with other research methods, the study of extended cases has proved useful in 
showing the actual uses and functions of norms and procedures in continuing 
social processes, ranging from the maintenance of order to the mobilisation of 
classes. Such extended case analysis could prove a useful tool in the hands of 
academic lawyers. Another contribution of some recent anthropological 
approaches is to demonstrate the difficulties and limitations inherent in using 
the 'society' or 'social formation' as a unit of analysis. These approaches often 
stress processes which are not necessarily or usually bounded by such social 
units; they demonstrate the worth of a processual method in analysing norms 
and institutions in the framework of social fields or arenas. With regard to 
specific themes, those often neglected by academic lawyers in the past have in­
cluded the existence of numerous modes of dispute settlement in addition to
176 At least if one accepts the useful stereotypes of "the lawyer" and "the anthropologist" set 




























































































courts, the critical importance of the litigant's perspective and the general so­
cial context of law. As shown here, both anthropologists and lawyers have re­
cently dealt with these themes in studies of dispute processing, people's per­
ceptions of access to justice and informal alternatives to courts.
One way in which previous anthropological work has been selectively 
incorporated into academic legal studies is exemplified by studies of dispute 
processing. Both lawyers and administrators have drawn on earlier 
anthropological research on this topic, but they have generally ignored 
anthropologists' emphasis on the limitations posed by different economic and 
cultural contexts on the creation of institutions. Despite a greater emphasis on 
context, few academic legal studies go as far as recent anthropological work 
in defining precisely the features of this context, whether in terms of the 
historical specificity of legal ideas, the relationships between a plurality of 
normative forms, or the importance of setting law in the context of continuing 
political and economic processes instead of viewing it in isolation.17?
In addition to its more specific contributions to academic legal studies, 
anthropological work in the past several decades has raised a number of basic 
issues concerning the study of legal processes which are of interest to 
academic lawyers and social theorists. The following may be mentioned 
briefly. Is the role of the social sciences in relation to legal studies best 
conceived as that of "under-labourer" or of "master-scientist"? In other 
words, by whom and how is the subject of study to be defined?17 78 How might 
micro-level studies, such as those common in anthropology, best be integrated 
with macro-sociological theories of law? To what extent, if at all, are
177 This is commonly viewed by lawyers as the major contribution of anthropology to legal 
studies; see Hooker, op.cit. n.42, esp. pp. 14, 54.
178 The relationship of social science to philosophy is discussed in these terms by P. Winch, 
The Idea o f a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (1958) and T. Benton, 
Philosophical Foundations o f the Three Sociologies (1977). For an analogous discussion 
concerning sociology and law, see Campbell and Wiles, op.cit. supra n. 6, and Abel, 
"Law Books and Books about Law" (review of M. Rheinstein, Marriage Stability, 




























































































anthropologists' conclusions concerning law or dispute processes in apparently 
exotic settings applicable to social relations elsewhere? To what extent is the 
cultural relativism of many anthropologists compatible with social theories of 
law that claim to be universally valid? Does the frequent insistence by 
anthropologists on cultural specificity extend not only to jurisprudential ideas 
but also to conceptions of scientific explanation, including explanations of the 
origin and role of legal forms?
The extent to which anthropological approaches are likely to be used by 
academic lawyers is likely to be influenced, however, by four other factors. 
First, anthropologists have insisted that law and legal processes are not neces­
sarily a monopoly of the state, even in American and European countries. 
This postulate controverts the statist conception of law commonly held by so­
ciologists of law and usually taught by academic lawyers. As a result, the lat­
ter in particular are likely to regard the pluralist conception of law not only 
as a central feature but also as a major weakness of many anthropological ap­
proaches. Anthropologists would contend, however, that the perspective of le­
gal pluralism raises many important questions, especially concerning intra­
group regulation and the relationships of powerful groups to the state, that 
often are not even asked within the terms of academic legal studies.
Second, despite an increasing interest in western legal systems, most 
anthropological work remains concentrated on small-scale legal processes in 
other countries. This research is especially pertinent to sociologists of law 
concerned with underdeveloped countries; but academic lawyers are likely to 
be deterred by detailed ethnographic data and thus fail to recognise the 
usefulness of anthropological methods of description and translation!79 in 
studying their own domestic legal systems.
179 Koch, "Law and Anthropology ...", op.cit. supra n.42, pp. 15-16 emphasises the trans­
lation of cognitive categories as an especially important part of legal anthropological 




























































































Third, anthropologists have often proclaimed their discipline to be 
inherently comparative. Except in the very limited sense of concentrating on 
groups or societies other than one’s own, however, very few anthropological 
studies are genuinely comparative, and therefore they offer only implicit 
contrasts with our own state and its law. The literature reviewed here and 
elsewhere, however, provides sufficient examples of comparative research 
and theory to be of interest to academic lawyers.
Fourth, though concerned increasingly with general social theory, legal 
anthropologists have so far made relatively few contributions to social 
theories of law. From the standpoint of both academic lawyers and 
sociologists of law (and indeed of anthropologists interested in law as an 
object of study), a particular weakness of many recent anthropological 
approaches in the past has been a tendency to reduce law to dispute settlement 
and to view legal and social processes as not simply inseparable but identical. 
This approach has proved valuable, both methodologically, in avoiding or 
minimising the use of western legal ideas in studying other societies, and 
substantively, in analysing social processes, including the role of norms in a 
broader context. Unfortunately, however, it meant that anthropologists 
concerned with the colonial period or with contemporary western countries 
often neglected state law, at least until the recent interest in political economy 
and history. This in turn has hindered the development of a theories of the 
relative autonomy of law or of the relationships between plural legal forms.
More broadly, from the standpoint of a genuinely comparative 
sociology of law, a final limitation of many anthropological studies lies in the 
ethnocentrism that often appears to be inherent in anthropology, as in other 
social sciences. Like sociology and economics, the discipline of anthropology 
is based on Western conceptions of science; it developed as a consequence of 
particular economic and political processes in European and American 




























































































be the universal science of humankind, they have frequently been unable to 
envisage social processes or legal forms in ways other than those based 
ultimately on their own historical and cultural experience, even though they 
have often gone further in this direction than neighbouring disciplines. The 
internationalisation of the anthropological profession, while raising new issues 
or posing old dilemmas in new forms, is therefore an extremely salutory 
development.
Two points can be made in conclusion. On the one hand, the 
anthropology of law is a myth if conceived as the search for a historical and 
cross-culturally valid features of law, or, alternatively, as the reduction of 
historically and culturally specific normative forms to ethnographic 
descriptions of individual behaviour. The reformulation of legal anthropology 
as the study of social order merely displaces these problems of theoretical 
perspectives and in turn raises others, including the difficulty of accounting 
for the pervasive importance and distinct role of state law. It may therefore 
be suggested that the task of legal anthropology in the future is two-fold: first, 
to elucidate the relationships between social action and cultural ideologies, 
and, second, to grasp the extent to which these relationships and the wider 
social processes of which they form a part are the product of specific 
historical and economic conditions. In this respect, anthropological 
approaches may contribute to and converge with sociology of law.
On the other hand, the study of legal pluralism opens up new 
possibilities for cross-fertilisation between anthropologists and academic 
lawyers. In this respect it resembles the earlier focus on disputes. Despite its 
deficiencies, the study of disputes served for some time as a useful 
methodological and theoretical bridge between specialists in numerous 
disciplines. Legal pluralism may operate as a similar device for cooperation. 
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